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Abstract
This paper examines how consumers react to the financial distress of durable goods man-
ufacturers by looking at the Swedish new car market. We employ a difference-in-differences
matching methodology whereby we compare sales of carmaker Saab with those of a carefully
constructed control group of substitute products. To account for possible substitution be-
tween products in the treatment and control groups, we propose and apply bounds to our
difference-in-differences matching estimator. We then refine the bounds and provide condi-
tions under which they depend only on the products’ own- and cross-price elasticities. We
find that even accounting for potential substitution, there was a significant decrease in the
sales of Saab following its filing for administration. These findings are robust to a number of
robustness checks and alternative hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
In a number of industries such as the automobile industry, both warranties and post-sales assistance
are prevalent and of such great importance to consumers that these are yet another dimension over
which carmakers differentiate their products (Cars.com 2011a, 2011b). As a result, whenever a
company producing automobiles, or any other durable good, faces financial difficulties – bankruptcy
in the extreme case – one might expect consumers to shy away from its products due to risks
associated with the company ceasing to exist and post-sales services tied to the product becoming
worthless (as modeled in, e.g. Titman 1984).
The importance of post-sales services to consumers make the auto industry well-suited for
studying how consumers perceive and react to the financial difficulties of carmakers. The studies
by Hammond (2013a) and Hortaçsu, Matvos, Syverson and Venkataraman (2013) have made use
of these features and, perhaps unsurprisingly, found that that financial distress of a carmaker does
affect the secondary car market; on average consumers are no longer willing to pay as much for a
used car produced by a carmaker that starts experiencing financial difficulties.
To study how consumers react to financial difficulties and distress on the primary market, one
has to establish among other things whether it is a carmaker’s financial health that is affecting
consumer behavior or vice-versa. In this study, we aim to resolve the issue of reverse causality by
focusing on the effects of Swedish carmaker Saab’s financial distress and filing for administration
on the Swedish new passenger car market.1 Saab, originally a domestic Swedish carmaker whose
products were praised by their admirers for the fine engineering and characteristic design, was
facing financial ills due to the parent company’s General Motors’ (GM) own financial problems of
late 2008.2 Following the financial aid package provided by the US Government to bail out GM
in late 2008, it eventually became clear that Saab would not benefit from a rescue of its parent
company. The terms of the emergency loan granted to GM were such that the money was to be
used to save American jobs and other funds would have to be used to keep Saab operational (SvD
2008b). Due to these circumstances, we argue that Saab’s financial situation was not a concern for
1Saab is known among car enthusiasts for (among other things) launching the first mainstream turbocharged
car ever sold, the Saab 99 (Popular Mechanics 2008).
2As detailed below, supply-side related concerns were not a major concern in Saab’s case.
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potential buyers until GM started experiencing its own financial troubles. Having lost the backing
of GM in early 2009 after a strategic review, the financial difficulties facing Saab led the company
to file for administration in February 2009. It was only months later that GM agreed on Saab’s
sale to a new owner with the financial backing of both the Swedish Government and the European
Investment Bank (EIB). As a result, once a binding deal regarding the sale of Saab to Koenigsegg
Group was signed in August 2009, Saab’s administration came to an end.
Empirical Strategy We use vehicle registration-based data to study purchases of new Saab
cars by private individuals in Sweden during the years 2006-2009. By doing so, we contribute to
a better overall understanding of how consumers react to financial distress and on the impact of
financial distress on a company.3
In our analysis, we take advantage of a key institutional setting of the Swedish new car market:
Sweden being a small market, car dealers keep low inventory levels, so consumers typically order
a car a few months in advance. This means that as long as Saab was producing cars, it would
have been possible to order a car as before. Further, this results in very few episodes of sales or
rebates from the part of carmakers or dealers, making the list prices we observe a much improved
approximation to transaction prices than in most markets, e.g. the U.S. As a result, we are able
to make use of both price and quantity information in our analysis.
Our identification relies on the credible exogeneity of GM’s financial health to Saab product
market performance but not to its financial one. That is, prior to filing for administration, Saab
could count on the financial backing of GM, a large multinational conglomerate which did on
several occasions inject funds into its subsidiary. However, this situation changed abruptly once
GM applied for financial assistance from the US Government, which set as a precondition that
US funds are only used to keep US jobs and could not be used to support Saab or other foreign
brands.
To identify and quantify the impact of Saab’s financial distress on consumer purchasing be-
havior, we use a difference-in-differences (DD) matching estimator whereby we compare the sales
3Although companies and the Swedish government purchase a significant share of new cars in Sweden, they do
not necessarily have the same objectives as consumers when purchasing automobiles. For instance, the Swedish
government has a mandate to buy environmentally friendly vehicles for non-emergency services.
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of Saab, the treatment group, to those of comparable cars on the Swedish market, the control
group. We propose constructing our control group by matching Saab products to a set of close
competitors according to observable product characteristics.4 More importantly, we propose a way
to estimate treatment effects when both treated and untreated subjects are likely to be affected
by the treatment. To do so, we propose economically-motivated bounds for the DD estimator we
consider. The motivation for the bounds comes from the fact that our control group for Saab prod-
ucts consists of close substitutes to the treated subjects. The fact that there may be substitution
from Saab products to the control group renders standard methods used in the treatment-effects
literature unfit for our purposes (see Angrist and Pischke 2010 and Nevo and Whinston 2010 for
a closely related exchange). For instance, in our application, substitution from the treatment to
control group results in standard DD estimates being biased upward (in absolute terms), i.e. any
consumer reaction to Saab’s financial ills is likely to be overstated by the standard DD estimator.
To account for this, we propose bounds for our DD matching estimator by assuming that the true
effect lies between no - and perfect substitution between treatment and control groups.
One concern raised by our empirical strategy – the matching procedure in particular – regards
how the size and composition of the control group affect the bounds we propose. That is, the
method might give researchers excessive leeway, so that in the extreme case, the choice of the
control group may determine the bounds to the DD effect. To address such concern, we provide
conditions under which our bounds are either not substantially, or not at all, influenced by the
choice of control group. First, a homogeneity condition whereby cross-price elasticities between
the treated subject and products within a market segment are similar. Second, a dominance
condition according to which the own-price elasticity of the treated subject dominates cross-price
elasticities between itself and products in the same market segment, which in turn dominate cross-
price elasticities between the treated subject and products in other market segments. Third, a
symmetry condition whereby products in the treatment and control groups have sales of similar
magnitudes. Under these conditions, the bounds become a function of own- and within-group
cross-price elasticities of the marketed products. Such conditions are consistent with empirical
findings for differentiated product markets (see Appendix B for an illustration) and allow the
4We also provide robustness checks using the synthetic matching methods of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).
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method to be applied within Industrial Organization and Antitrust settings.
Although one could think that the assumptions we impose would result in uninformative (i.e.
overly wide) bounds, we show in our application that even without refining the bounds we obtain
results pointing to a significant effect of Saab’s financial distress on its sales.
Main Findings In contrast to previous findings for the used car market, we find limited evidence
that prices of the Saab brand as a whole responded to its financial distress. As a result, we focus
primarily on its sales. Doing so, we find ample evidence that consumers react to Saab’s financial
troubles; our most conservative results point to consumer reactions corresponding to a decrease
of over 200 units sold by the Saab brand, as compared to the control group, a sizable 50 and 56
percent effect if compared to unconditional average sales of Saab which amount to 470 units per
month. Given the ample evidence of the existence of a home-bias in both the International Trade
and Industrial Organization literature, especially for the auto industry, see for instance Goldberg
and Verboven (2001, 2005), one could think that such effects might be stronger for foreign brands
operating in a given market. All in all, our estimates for the new car market are one order of
magnitude larger than those previously obtained in the literature looking at the used car market.
The strength of our results leads us to explore alternative explanations for our findings. First,
we focus on additional reasons – above and beyond the finance channel – that are likely to drive
consumer reactions. In addition to documenting that are findings are unlikely to be driven by
supply effects, we show that our results survive a number of robustness tests, including accounting
for increased promotional activity of competing brands, news coverage, technological laggardness
of Saab products and different treatment periods. In particular, our results are also obtained using
different control groups.
Second, we consider the external validity of our results. The Swedish market is broadly com-
parable to other European markets (see e.g. Table 1 of Huse and Lucinda 2014 for details). For
instance, ACEA (2015) reports that new passenger car registrations in Sweden are 32 vehicles/1000
inhabitants, roughly between those of Germany and France (38 and 27 vehicles/1000 inhabitants,
respectively). Moreover, we have also considered the effect of financial distress on the sales of Opel
products, the best-selling GM brand in Sweden. Our results suggests that any differences in the
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results of Opel and Saab are due to their different status in GM’s restructured brand portfolio.
Contribution We contribute to a rich literature investigating the costs of financial distress and
its effects on the product market and on firm performance. On the theoretical front, Titman
(1984)’s results point to the major role played by decreases in demand as a result of financial
distress. On the empirical front, there are conflicting views regarding how distressed companies
respond, typically focusing on prices; while the studies of Chevalier (1995) and Matsa (2011)
document that supermarket increase prices when in financial distress, Busse (2002) finds that firms
in worse financial condition are more likely to start price wars in her study of the airline industry.
More recently, Hammond (2013a) and Hortaçsu et al (2013) examine the used car market and find
evidence of (single-digit) price reactions as a consequence of financial distress of a company. Our
results suggest that the main channel whereby market participants react to financial distress is
quantities, very much in the spirit of Titman (1984). Such reaction is significant both statistically
and – at roughly 50% reduction in sales – economically. The limited evidence of price reactions in
the case of the Saab brand to countervail the substantial decrease in quantities allows to estimate
the loss in revenues of the distressed company, in contrast to previous literature.
Methodologically, we provide bounds derived using economic assumptions in a setting when
standard reduced-form methods are unfit for use (Nevo and Whinston 2010). Initially, such bounds
are obtained assuming that there is either no or full substitution between treatment and control
groups. They can be moreover refined by assuming substitution patterns between products are
well-behaved and consistent with empirical findings for many differentiated products markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the market. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 5 presents the results.
2 Market
2.1 Overview
Hosting two carmakers, Sweden is highly dependent on the automobile industry, which is key
to employment, investments, exports and R&D in the country. In fact, out of a population of
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roughly 9 million, some 120,000 are employed by the automobile industry which is responsible for
over 10 percent of Swedish exports (BIL Sweden 2010). Moreover, Sweden is the second and first
market for local brands Volvo and Saab, respectively (BIL Sweden 2010). Having originated in
Sweden, Volvo and Saab were taken over by US carmakers, thus becoming brands within global
car conglomerates Ford and GM, respectively.
While Volvo has been regularly on the top spot, commanding a market share of about 15 percent
over the years, Saab has consistently been the 10th top selling brand in the Swedish market prior
to administration, with a market share in the range 4-5 percent. This is consistent with previous
evidence of a home-bias whereby consumers tend to favor domestic car brands (Goldberg and
Verboven 2001). Other major carmakers in terms of sales include Toyota, Peugeot, Volkswagen
and Ford, as reported in Table 1. Overall, the Swedish new car market is comparable to those of
other European countries albeit having a preference for more powerful, heavier cars (see e.g. Huse
and Lucinda 2014).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Car sales in the Swedish market peaked in 2007 and depressed considerably in June 2009 with the
global recession.5 Even within the Swedish market, Saab had sold just over 6,000 units annually
in the years prior to 2009 at which point sales declined more than for the other brands with Saab
sales having fallen by 65 percent.
Throughout the years, Saab has produced few models which are praised by their admirers for the
fine engineering and characteristic design. Its very size was one of its major hurdles, as the brand
was unable to explore economies of scale well-known to exist in the automobile industry. Coupled
with the fact that GM never fully integrated Saab into its portfolio of brands, the growing feeling
over the years was that Saab was beginning to lag behind its competitors due to high development
costs combined with low production levels.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
5This period coincided with the green car rebate (GCR) between 2007 and 2009, which provided a transfer of
10,000 SEK (roughly USD 1,500) for consumers purchasing an environmentally friendly (“green”) car. See Huse
(2014) for a detailed description of the GCR.
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Table 2 compares a number of characteristics of Saab vehicles against those of other brands for years
2006-2009, providing difference-in-means tests between Saab and non-Saab vehicles.6 Typically,
Saab models are less fuel-efficient, more expensive, heavier and more powerful than the average
car sold in Sweden for each year in the sample. Notably, there are few statistically significant
differences between Saab and control group vehicles. However, Saab does stand out in terms
of horse power, producing significantly more powerful cars than those of the control groups. In
particular, while (sales-weighted) CO2 emissions in the Swedish market followed a downward trend
during the sample period, the effect was much less pronounced among Saab models, hinting that
the brand was lagging in terms of technological development - although the observed differences
are not statistically significant. Comparing the sales-weighted characteristics of Saab to those of
closely competing models, we see that the average improvements that can be observed for the
market as a whole are no longer as obvious for this sub-sample of vehicles. For instance, although
fuel economy has been slightly better for competing models, no clear improvements in fuel economy
have been made in comparison to the Saab products when looking at the entire sample period.
2.2 Saab Automobile
Saab Automobile became a fully-owned subsidiary of GM Europe in 2000, when GM purchased a
50 percent stake in Saab from Investor AB for USD 125 million (Investor AB 2000) after ten years
of joint ownership. Saab was one of a total of twelve other brands owned by GM, but in 2008 it
accounted for sales of roughly 100,000 units (Saab History, 2008) out of a total of 8.5 million units
sold by GM worldwide (General Motors, 2009). As a result, it is highly unlikely that Saab may
have played any role in GM’s financial situation.
What is perhaps more striking is that, out of the twenty years of GM ownership, Saab only
generated a profit in two, with GM consistently injecting money into its subsidiary (Dagens In-
dustri, 2009c).7 That is, even if Saab arguably lacked the sales volume of close competitors such
6Although we have sales data from 2005, we look only at data starting from 2006 due to the construction of the
control groups. See section 5.2 for details.
7Although justifications may have differed from one year to the next, GM did regularly inject funds into Saab.
For instance, GM justified stepping in during August 2005 due to a weakening of the US dollar, high development
costs and increased price competition from other brands (SvD 2008a).
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as Audi and BMW in global terms, it was consistently among the top ten best-selling brand in its
main market (see Table 1). More importantly, Saab could very much count on continuous funding
provided by GM to finance its operations. Thus, despite a less-than-stellar performance in the
product market, it is unrealistic to think of the Saab brand as being in financial distress.8
Things were to change dramatically for Saab following the US financial package to rescue GM
and Chrysler. When GM appealed for emergency aid to remain solvent in late 2008, the U.S.
government’s willingness to aid the automobile industry initially sparked hope for Saab whose
future was becoming increasingly uncertain. However, GM made it clear that financial aid would
not be provided to its European operations (Dagens Industri 2008a). That is, the terms of the
emergency loan granted to GM were such that the money would be used to save American jobs
and instead that other funds would have to be used to keep Saab going (SvD 2008b), at least until
a strategic global overview had been conducted.
In early 2009 GM announced that Saab was to become a more independent company, in what
was seen as a first step in preparing Saab for a future divestiture and a possible precondition
for receiving financial aid from the Swedish government (Dagens Industri 2009a). On February
12th 2009, GM asked the Swedish government to back a SEK 5 billion loan from the European
Investment Bank (SvD 2009a).9 Without the backing of either the Swedish government or GM,
Saab was forced into filing for an emergency loan at the EIB on its own (TT News Agency 2008,
2009a). On February 17th 2009, GM presented its restructuring plan to the US Congress with
Saab no longer being a part of its future strategy (SvD 2009b). On February 18th, GM announced
plans to sell Saab and that if Saab were to remain solvent until a sale was completed, the company
would require emergency loans from the Swedish government (TT News Agency 2009b)
On February 20th 2009, Saab officially filed for administration.10 While under administration,
8This suggests that Saab was in economic distress during a longer period but that any additional drop in
performance due to GM’s inability to continue to provide funding to Saab is primarily due to financial distress and
not economic distress.
9This amounts to approximately USD 600 million at the then prevailing exchange rate of 8.42 SEK/USD.
10In Sweden, a company may file for bankruptcy or administration. Administration, legally speaking, is available
for companies that are very likely to fail to fulfill their financial obligations in the short term but are deemed to
have future potential. To be granted the related legal status, a company must apply with a court which may or may
not grant administration status for up to one year. If a company is allowed to enter into administration, it is legally
allowed to delay honoring legal obligations while at the same time being legally protected from debt collectors.
Furthermore, during administration a company cannot be forced into bankruptcy. The period of administration
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it was expected that Saab would continue to operate, although there were concerns that sales
would be depreciated further if worried consumers were to stop buying Saab products altogether.
Production was interrupted for only one week, i.e. until until February 27th, when Saab was able
to obtain liquid funds and pay outstanding fees (TT News Agency 2009c).11 GM started honoring
credit lines open on Saab’s behalf on March 2nd 2009 as it entered administration. As a result,
key suppliers were able to resume operations and supply Saab with the necessary components to
keep production open (Dagens Industri 2009b).
Despite the rumored interest of a number of companies, it took until May 29 2009 to find Saab a
potential buyer - Swedish sports carmaker Koenigsegg, which went on to sign an intent to purchase
Saab on June 15 (TT News Agency 2009d). Part of the deal was an expected government-backed
loan of USD 600 million from the EIB and a strategic partnership with GM whereby it would
supply Saab with engines and transmission systems (Saab AB 2009). On August 17 2009, GM
and Koenigsegg Group, a consortium led by Koenigsegg, signed a binding deal regarding the sale
of Saab. As a result, on August 19th 2009 Saab officially filed for an end to administration, which
was granted on August 21st (TT News Agency 2009e).
3 Data
We combine administrative-based registration data with publicly-available car characteristics. The
details are as follows.
Vehicle characteristics Product characteristics for years 2005-2009 are obtained from the con-
sumer guide, the New Car Guide (Nybilsguiden), issued by the Swedish Consumer Agency (Kon-
sumentverket). For every car model available on the Swedish market the information includes
characteristics such as fuel type, engine power and displacement, number of cylinders, number
ends after the court deems the company financially capable of continuing to operate.
11Anecdotal evidence also suggests that a large number of suppliers manufacturing components for Saab vehicles
were poorly diversified in that many produced components were only suitable for use in Saab vehicles. This
suggests that some smaller manufacturers may have gone out of business, since suppliers could not easily switch
from supplying Saab with parts to another manufacturer. Despite this, we have found no accounts to suggest that
Saab had difficulty in finding suppliers for manufacturing parts leading to supply problems of either the Saab 9-3
or 9-5.
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of doors, gearbox type, weight, fuel economy12, CO2 emissions, vehicle tax and list prices. List
prices, sticker prices or MSRPs (manufacturer’s suggested retail prices) are set by manufacturers
and are typically constant across geographic markets within a model-year. Given the difficulty in
obtaining transaction prices, MSRPs have commonly been used in the literature, see e.g. Huse
and Lucinda (2014) for a recent study of the Swedish market. Importantly, since Sweden is a small
market, car dealers keep low inventory levels, so consumers typically order a car a few months in
advance, which results in few episodes of sales or rebates from the part of carmakers or dealers,
making the list prices we observe a much improved approximation to transaction prices than in
most markets, e.g. the US.
Vehicle registrations Car registration data was provided by Vroom Stockholm, a consulting
company. The data on privately-owned vehicles is recorded at the monthly frequency from January
2005 to December 2009.13 An observation is a combination of year, brand, model, engine size, fuel
type (thus more disaggregated than the typical market level data set) and market segment.
Sweden being a small market, car dealers keep very low inventory levels, so much so that
typically one has to order a car a few months in advance and make a deposit (anecdotal evidence
is that delivery times can take from four weeks to four months). This results in very few episodes
of sales or rebates from the part of carmakers and/or dealers. Moreover, if anything, we can expect
transaction prices to be lower than list prices e.g. due to fire selling or retailer discounting, thus
underestimating the treatment effect.
Combining vehicle datasets Given the different levels of aggregation, we merge characteristics
and registration datasets by month-brand-model-fuel type and attribute the sales of all versions
of a given model to its baseline characteristic specification.
Demand shifters We consider a number of alternative demand shifters; First, we include an
indicator for the GCR period (from April 2007 to June 2009), since certain vehicles were eligible
for a rebate. Second, we consider a measure of consumer confidence from the National Institute
12Fuel economy is measured in terms of city, highway and mixed driving, with testing conducted under a EU-
determined driving cycle and expressed in liters per 100 kilometers, or 100 cubic meters per km for gas (CNG) cars.
CO2 emissions are measured in gCO2/km under EU-determined driving conditions and mixed driving.
13Legally, the registration of a motor vehicle with the Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen) must take
place within ten working days of a change in vehicle ownership.
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for Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet). Consumer confidence is a leading indicator for the
purchase of durable products, see Ludvigson (2004) for a survey and Friberg and Huse (2012) for
an application to the demand for new automobiles. Finally, we include controls for new versions
of existing products, so as to account for re-design, facelifts etc. of models in the control group,
which are likely demand shifters. In order to determine which models within a control group have
had a facelift or redesign, we proceeded by looking at photos in carmakers’ websites and specialized
magazines.
4 Bounding the Treatment Effect
We are interested in estimating whether consumers react to the financial distress of Saab. To
establish a causal link between consumer behavior and Saab’s financial health, we rely on the
particular institutional setting of the market, whereby any measurable impact is in fact caused by
the financial distress of Saab and not the prior behavior of consumers or suppliers, i.e. causality
runs from the company’s financial side towards the product market - something we discuss in more
detail when defining the treatment period.
In order to identify and quantify the impact of Saab’s financial distress on consumer purchasing
behavior we use a difference-in-differences (DD) matching estimator. DD is commonly used to
estimate the impact of a treatment or event on a predetermined treatment group or individual.
The effect of the treatment is obtained by comparing the outcomes of the treated group with
that of a carefully selected control group. The difference in post-treatment outcomes between the
two groups measures the differential impact of the treatment itself. While one may indeed find
differences in post-treatment outcomes between the treated and untreated (control) groups, the
underlying cause of any such difference may be due to factors other than the treatment itself. To
minimize the chance of factors other than Saab’s financial distress being responsible for changes in
consumer behavior, we construct control groups at the level of year-model-fuel type, e.g. a 2008
Saab 9-3 running on diesel, using matching techniques.
Given our particular setting, one valid concern is that since elements of the control group are
close competitors to those in the treatment group, there is a potential mismeasurement in the
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effect of the treatment. This relates to an ongoing debate regarding the use of treatment-effects
methods in Industrial Organization – especially merger analysis – see Angrist and Pischke (2010)
and Nevo and Whinston (2010). One criticism of DD methods comes from the fact that treatment
may affect not only the treatment group but also the control group. This effect is of special concern
in a setting of strategic interactions among players. In our case, unlike the studies of Hammond
(2013a) and Hortaçsu et al (2013), we focus on quantities instead of prices; whenever the sales of
the treated group decrease those of the control group are likely to react in the opposite direction
as consumers substitute from treatment group elements to control group elements. This reaction
will be an indirect treatment effect of the treatment on the treated with a less than proportional
increase occurring if some of the consumers opting not to buy an element of the treatment group
also choose not to purchase an element of the control group. Hammond (2013b) faces a similar
issue when studying the effect of automobile recalls on vehicle resale values: the fact that Toyota
recalled some vehicles due to safety concerns may have had a positive impact on competing brands’
resale values, as current Toyota users replace their vehicle or potential Toyota buyers switch to
competing brands. Alternatively, there may have been a negative spillover as consumers may have
switched to domestic brands altogether.
4.1 Bounds and the Indirect Treatment Effect
Although we cannot be sure of the extent of the indirect treatment effect or substitution looking
only at aggregate data, we are able to say something about the true treatment effect if we are
willing to consider the two most extreme scenarios regarding substitution from the treatment to
control group. That is, that either all of the consumers that switch away from the treatment
group substitute to the control group, or that none of the consumers substitute to the control
group. Together, these two extremes will bound the true estimate, regardless of the true level
of substitution.14 In our case, the observed control group sales are a combination of sales to
consumers who would have purchased an element from the control group regardless of treatment
14For a rigorous analysis of the bounding of treatment effects in the presence of contaminated or corrupted data
see Horowitz and Manski (1995), who show how to construct bounds for models in which one observes data that is
composed of a true observation plus some noise.
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being applied to the treatment group and the consumers who decide to purchase an element in the
control group as a consequence of treatment.15
Setup Assume a two-period difference-in-differences specification given by
yit = θi + µt + TtGiδ + uit (1)
where
θi = θ +Giφ
and
µt = Ttµ
The parameter θ measures the control group mean pre-treatment, µ measures the difference in
control group means between pre- and post-treatment periods, φ measures the difference in means
between treatment and control group pre-treatment. The time periods are denoted by t = 1, 2,
yit is the true outcome variable of both the untreated and treated groups, which are indexed by
i = c, τ , and Gi takes on a value of one if the observation is a treated subject and zero otherwise,
whereas Tt takes on a value of one for observations falling within the treatment period and zero
otherwise. The coefficient of interest is given by δ and measures the treatment effect. Further,
assume that treatment is exogenous, that is, treatment is uncorrelated with the error term uit.
Assumption A1 The true post-treatment outcome variable for the control group is potentially
biased by an indirect treatment effect d given by the number of consumers having substituted from
the treatment group. Formally, let us rewrite the model in (1) as
y∗it = θi + µt + Tt (Giδ + (1−Gi) d) + uit (2)
15Related strategies have been pursued by Sallee (2011), who uses bounded treatment effects to measure the
incidence of tax credits for the Toyota Prius.
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or more compactly as
y∗it = θi + µ∗t + TtGiδ∗ + uit (3)
where δ∗ = (δ − d), µ∗t = (µt + Ttd) and following treatment, the control group outcome variable
absorbs some unobservable non-random value d.

This assumption states that the sales of the control group we observe may be biased because
consumers that would have bought a Saab product switched to a vehicle belonging to the control
group. If we look at the expected outcome for the control group post-treatment, we have
E [y∗it|Gi = 0, Tt = 1] = E [yit|Gi = 0, Tt = 1] + d
= θc + µ2 + d
where we see the outcome is biased by the indirect treatment effect d. Furthermore, we see that
the OLS estimate of the treatment effect as given in (3) will be
δ∗ = δ − d
that is, the estimated treatment effect δ∗ will be a biased estimate of the true treatment effect δ.
The coefficient µ∗t will analogously be biased but as this coefficient is not the main focus of our
study we will only mention that bounds can also be derived for this coefficient in much the same
way as we do below for the treatment effect δ.
In our application, we expect d to be positive because we believe there is likely to be a positive
substitution effect away from Saab to the control group. That is, we believe the sales of the control
group will be higher than they would otherwise have been, absent Saab’s filing for administration.
Without loss of generality, let us also assume that the true treatment effect δ is non-positive,
δ ≤ 0. That is, we are assuming ex-ante that Saab’s sales are going to fall due to it’s filing for
administration. This assumption allows us to bound the indirect treatment effect d in a natural
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and intuitive way, as will become clear with the next assumption.
Assumption A2 The indirect treatment effect d is bounded
∆L ≤ d ≤ ∆U
In particular, 0 ≤ d ≤ −δ.

Assumption A2 seems natural if, for instance, the object of interest is quantities or market
shares; in this case, the indirect treatment effect can be bound by zero and, say, total sales.
Implicit in this assumption are assumptions regarding substitution to the outside good: on the
one extreme, we say that the average drop in Saab sales is entirely absorbed into the outside
good (d = 0) whereas on the other extreme we say that no consumer chooses the outside good
(d = −δ).16
Assumption A3 The control group consists ofK ≥ 1 equally weighted individuals. This implies
that the outcome of the control group, yct, is the equally-weighted average of the K individuals’
outcomes, ykt. Formally, assume
yct =
1
K
∑
k
ykt
Within the control group, assume that each element k absorbs dk units from the treatment group
in the post-treatment period, with d = ∑k dk. Formally, with an equally-weighted control group
the biased outcome is given by
16The outside good is for example a car model outside of the closest competitors of Saab used to form the
control group, or to postpone the purchase of a car into the non-foreseeable future. While Huse and Lucinda (2014)
provide structural evidence that the share of the outside good did not change during the period of the GCR, which
encompasses that of Saab’s administration, we prefer to be conservative and further control for a number of demand
shifters likely to affect demand more locally, see Section 3.
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y∗ct =
1
K
(y1t + Ttd1 + ...+ ykt + Ttdk)
= 1
K
∑
k
ykt +
1
K
Tt
∑
k
dk
= yct +
1
K
Ttd
= yct + Ttd∗
which consists of the average of all individual control group elements, yct, pre-treatment (when
Tt = 0), and the average of these outcomes, yct, together with the average of the indirect treatment
effect given by d∗ = 1
K
d, post-treatment (when Tt = 1). This comes from the fact that although the
control group elements absorb d units in sum, the group as a whole absorbs on average d∗ = 1
K
d.

Assumption A3 is illustrated by the following example.
Example In our setting, the control group consists of Saab’s close competitors with the control
group outcome being a simple average of each of the competitors’ outcomes. For instance, if Volvo
sells 100 units of its V70 and 150 units of its V50 post treatment, a control group consisting only
of these two models will have an average outcome of 125 units. If we assume that Saab loses 10
units in sales post treatment which are fully absorbed by the V70 and the V50, for instance with
all 10 units being absorbed by the V70, the control group outcome will instead be 130 - the average
of 110 and 150. That is, the control group outcome is the sum of the true outcome yct = 125 and
the average of the total number of units absorbed by the V70 and the V50 post treatment, namely
d∗ = 102 = 5.
As established above, the estimated treatment effect is given by δ∗ = δ− d, where d is the indirect
treatment effect. If we use a control group of equally weighted individuals, then from assumption
A3 we see that the indirect treatment effect is instead d∗ = 1
K
d giving the estimated treatment
effect as δ∗ = δ − 1
K
d . From this relationship we see that δ ∼= δ∗ as K, the number of control
group elements, grows large, i.e. the bias vanishes as K increases. However, it is also important
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to emphasize the trade-offs involved in choosing the size of the control group, since an overly large
control group would consist of subjects that will no longer be substitutes of those in the treatment
group. In our setting, the more models we include in the control group, the more likely we are
to include vehicles which can no longer be seen as close substitutes to Saab vehicles. In the most
extreme case, one could include all models available on the market while on the other one could
include only one. As discussed below, under mild conditions one obtains that the bounds depend
on the the own-price elasticity of the treatment group and the cross-price elasticities between
elements of the treatment and control groups. This is intuitive since the indirect treatment effect
is the result of the substitutability between elements in the treatment and control groups. Before,
Proposition 1 below derives more general properties of the bounds.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then the true treatment effect δ is bounded.
Formally,
δ∗ + ∆L ≤ δ ≤ δ∗ + ∆U (4)

Proof: See Appendix.
This proposition states that although we do not know the true treatment effect δ we can
nevertheless say something about its magnitude if we are willing to make assumptions about the
bounds of the indirect treatment effect d. For instance, if we assume that there is no bias, that is
∆L = ∆U = 0, then the estimated treatment effect δ∗ is going to be equal to the true treatment
effect δ. If on the other hand we have a strictly positive bias (∆U > ∆L > 0), Proposition 1 tells us
that given a non-positive treatment effect, δ ≤ 0, we will underestimate the true treatment effect
by at least ∆L and at most ∆U .
Corollary 1 (Bounded EW Estimator) Let assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Then the
true treatment effect is bounded by
δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ K
K + 1δ
∗ (5)
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Alternatively, for any constant level of substitution λ ∈ [0, 1] the true treatment effect is given b
δ = K
K + λδ
∗

Proof: See Appendix.
Although Proposition 1 makes the general statement that we are able to find bounds on the
true treatment effect δ even in the presence of an indirect treatment effect d, Corollary 1 provides
specific bounds for the true treatment effect δ given our assumptions on the bounds of the indirect
treatment effect d. The lower bound is simply the case when there is no indirect treatment effect
and the true treatment effect δ equals the estimated treatment effect δ∗. Given our previous
assumption that the outcome of the control group is an average of the control group individuals’
outcomes, the upper bound is a function of how many elements we include in our control group with
the interval narrowing as the number of control group elements K increases. However, we need not
assume that there is either perfect or no substitution, assuming instead that substitution is given
by some fixed fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the true treatment effect. Although less conservative, such an
assumption would allow us to fully recover the true treatment effect through the relationship given
by δ = K
K+λδ
∗.
Corollary 2 (Bounded EW Estimator Variance) For any constant fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of
consumers in the treatment group switching to the control group and constant size of the control
group K ≥ 1, the variance of the treatment effect estimator can be written as
V ar
(
δˆ
)
=
[
K
K + λ
]2
V ar
(
δˆ∗
)
(6)

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Proof: See Appendix.
One implication of an indirect treatment effect is that the variance of the estimated coefficient
δ∗ will also be incorrect, as seen from (6). The result of Corollary 2 parallels that of Corollary
1 in that if we were to assume, or know, the true fraction λ of consumers substituting from the
treatment to the control group we would be able to correct the variance of the estimate in order
to do correct inference.
Corollary 3 (Standardized EW Estimator) The standardized estimate of the treatment
effect remains unchanged by the bias d, that is
δˆ∗√
V ar
(
δˆ∗
) = δˆ√
V ar
(
δˆ
) (7)

Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 3 states that although there may be an indirect treatment effect that over - or
underestimates the true treatment effect, because the indirect treatment effect merely inflates
the estimate and it’s variance, the two effects exactly cancel out leaving T-statistics unchanged.
Although we construct 95% confidence intervals using block bootstrapping to avoid small sample
issues of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected estimators of standard errors, Corollary
3 states that we could have used regular T-statistics had we had a robust estimate of the coefficient
standard errors.17
4.2 Refining the Bounds
Our analysis so far has obtained bounds without imposing much economic structure, the exception
being the existence of an outside good. In what follows, we will make assumptions on substitution
patterns between products in order to obtain bounds which satisfy two conditions. First, the
17Our choice of the block bootstrap is expected to improve on standard bootstrap methods such as in Horowitz
and Manski (2000) due to its accounting of potential autocorrelation in the data.
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bounds should be more informative than those obtained above.18 Second, the bounds should not
depend on the size of the control group. That is, to the extent possible, the bounds should be
determined by the data rather than by the researcher.
Our analysis relies on bounding the substitution parameter between treatment and control
groups, λ, known in the literature as the diversion ratio and widely used in antitrust analysis
(Shapiro 1996, Werden 1998). Assuming without loss of generality that K ′ elements of the control
group are in the same market segment as the treated subject and K ′′ in other market segments
(so K ′ +K ′′ = K), one can write
λ := ∆qC∆qT
= −εCT
εTT
qC
qT
= −
K∑
i=1
εiT
εTT
qi
qT
= −
∑K′
i εiT qi
εTT qT
−
∑K′′
i εiT qi
εTT qT
where qT and qC are total sales of treatment and control groups, εiT is the cross-price elasticity
between the treatment group and element i of the control group, εTT is the own-price elasticity
of the treatment group and εCT is the cross-price elasticity of the control group with respect to
prices of the treatment group.19
To investigate how the substitution parameter changes as a function of the size and the com-
position of the control group, we need the following assumptions.
Assumption E1 (Dominance) The own price elasticity of the treatment group dominates the
sum of the cross-price elasticities between elements of the treatment and control groups,
|εTT | ≥
K∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT

Assumption E1, which applies only to elements of the treatment and control groups, is implied
by an elasticity matrix with a dominant diagonal.20 Intuitively, it holds if consumers decide not
to purchase any product given that treatment occurred. In our application, this amounts to a
18Recall that λ ∈ [0, 1] and λ = 0 is the standard DD case.
19We assume throughout that the treatment group has a single element for the sake of tractability.
20The dominant diagonal condition is given by |εjj | ≥
∑
j 6=i |εji|,∀i, j = 1, ..., J, where J(> K) is the number of
inside products, i.e. all products on the market.
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consumer not purchasing a new vehicle due to the financial ills of Saab, for instance.
Assumption E2 (Substitutability) Let the cross-price elasticities between a product and its
substitutes in the same market segment dominate its cross-price elasticities with respect to products
in other market segments. Moreover, let the latter be negligible, in the sense that substitution is
mostly within a market segment. Since K ′ elements of the control group are in the same market
segment and K ′′ elements of the control group are in other market segments, one can write
K∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT =
K′∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT +
K′′∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT ≈
K′∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT

Assumption A2 posits the existence of different market segments, which is typical of differ-
entiated products markets such as the automobile industry. What is more, while the closer the
substitution between two products, the higher their cross-price elasticities, Assumption E2 requires
that there is virtually no substitution between products in different market segments. Economi-
cally, this is consistent with the fact that consumers choose among products which are somewhat
similar in characteristics space. In particular, it is consistent with estimates coming from (one-
level) nested logit demand models, where cross-price effects within a nest are substantially larger
than cross-price effects between nests, which are often negligible.21
Assumption E3 (Homogeneity) Assume the market under consideration is segmented, with
homogenous cross-price elasticities within and across market segments denoted by εH and εL,
respectively, with the homogeneous elasticities satisfying22
K∑
i=1,i 6=T
εiT ≤ K ′εH +K ′′εL

21In Appendix B, we report estimates of nested logit specifications which are consistent with the above assumption,
see Table B1. For instance, in Specification 5 the average within-nest (cross-nest) cross-price elasticity is 0.06 (0.01)
with standard deviation 0.12 (0.01).
22Formally, εH denotes the cross-price elasticity between the treatment group and elements of the control group
in the same market segment as those in the treatment group whereas εL denotes the cross-price elasticity between
the treatment group and elements of the control group in different market segments.
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Homogeneity of the elasticities is not crucial, but facilitates obtaining analytical results. Ex-
amples of functions satisfying the inequality in Assumption E3 are averages or maxima of the
elasticities within a segment. Assumption A3 could be further generalized by assuming richer
patterns (consistent with, say, a multi-level nested logit model), but this is unlikely to add much
in terms of insight.23 24
Assumption E4 (Symmetry) Products in the control and treatment groups have sales of
similar magnitudes, qi ≈ qT ≈ q˜,∀i ∈ CG.

Assumption E4 is also made for the sake of tractability. Alternatively, one could assume that
sales of the treated product are a scaled version of the typical element of the control group, but
this would add little in terms of insight.
In what follows, we bound the substitution parameter λ using the above assumptions and then
provide the associated bounds to the DD effect.
Proposition 2 Let assumptions E1-E4 hold. Then
λ ≤ −K ′ εH
εTT
≤ 1

From Proposition 2, the diversion ratio λ is affected only by the number of products in the
control group in the same market segment as the product in the treatment group, in addition to the
corresponding own- and cross-price elasticities. Interestingly, ∂λ
∂K
= − εH
εTT
> 0 meaning that even
if lambda never reaches 1, it increases – at a rate determined by the ratio of own- and cross-price
elasticities – with the number of within-nest elements belonging to the control group, K ′.
23For instance, in a two-level nested logit model would have cross-price elasticities within a subgroup, between
different subgroups of the same groups and between different groups.
24Table B1 in Appendix B reports findings consistent with the assumption of homogeneity, i.e. cross-price
elasticities within a segment have the same magnitude and are typically clustered around their mean.
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Corollary 4 Let the assumptions in Proposition 2 hold. Moreover, let the elements in the
control group and the market segment of the treated subject coincide (K ′ = K). Then the DD
effect can be bounded as follows25
δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ εTT
εTT − εH δ
∗
where δ∗ is the naive (OLS) DD estimate.

Within the framework of a one-level nested logit model, the assumptions above imply that those
products in the control group are within the same nest as the product in the treatment group.
From Corollary 4, once one assumes that K ′ = K, a sensible assumption if one is to believe that
the control group should only contain elements in the same market segment as the treated subject,
the relation between the biased DD estimate and the true one depends on own- and cross-price
elasticities.26 Alternatively, given the naive (OLS) DD estimates δ∗, the upper bound of the true
DD effect is obtained by multiplying the naive estimate by a term consisting of price elasticities.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Treatment Period
The DD estimator quantifies the effect of a treatment – Saab’s financial distress in our application
– on an outcome by comparing the average change over time in such outcome for treatment and
25We have also derived results where we replace E1-E3 with a stronger dominance condition (E1’), ρ|εTT | ≥∑K
i=1,i6=T εiT , ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Under E1’ and E4, we obtain λ ≤ ρ , i.e. the diversion ratio is majorated by the dominance
parameter, ρ. This implies that δ ∈
[
δ∗, KK+ρδ
∗
]
, i.e. as in the previous section, the bound narrows as the size
of the control group grows large. While the bounds still depend on the size of the control group, the result allows
comparing the relative importance of the dominance parameter and the size of the control group, with a stronger
dominance parameter (lower ρ) resulting in a narrower interval for the DD effect. Moreover, comparing the latter
result with the one in the text stresses the price to be paid in terms of assumptions to obtain bounds which do not
depend on the size of the control group. The results are available from the authors upon request.
26Note, however, that the cross-price elasticity εH likely changes with the size of the control group if it is not the
case that K ′ = K. For instance, by leaving out of the control group one element of the same market segment as
the treated subject, one would be affecting the cross-price elasticity; arguably, this impact is more likely to be felt
if εH is taken to be the average cross-price elasticity than the maximum cross-price elasticity.
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control groups. This definition of treatment poses a problem of defining a specific point in time
when the treatment was administered to the treatment group. Financial distress is generally not
something that occurs instantaneously, being rather the consequence of poor financial conditions of
a company over a certain, often prolonged, period of time. Not all companies with a poor financial
situation can be construed as financially distressed. Instead, only once a certain threshold is
crossed can a company realistically be defined as being financially distressed. One such threshold,
if a little extreme, is the filing of a company for bankruptcy or administration; once a company
files for bankruptcy or administration, as Saab did in February 2009, little doubt can remain as
to whether the company is in financial distress or not. Alternatively, one could argue that what
really triggers financial distress in Saab’s case are GM’s financial troubles, which were made public
in November 2008 or when GM officially applied for emergency financial aid in December 2008.
The end of treatment for Saab is less of a controversy: having filed for administration, Saab
was not liquidated but continued to operate under administration until the Swedish Courts ruled
it was out of administration on August 21 2009.27
In what follows, we define the treatment period to start when GM’s financial problems become
public, that is November 2008, and to end in August 2009. This treatment window yields the
more conservative estimates of the treatment. In particular, our reported estimates are more
conservative than those resulting from a treatment period starting in February 2009.
One natural concern is that Saab’s poor sales performance started due to Saab’s own financial
issues that either did, or did not, influence GM’s financial situation. However, recall from Section
2 that it is highly unlikely that any financial issues Saab may have had would have affected GM,
mainly due to Saab being much smaller. Moreover, Saab only turned a profit on two out of the
twenty years under GM ownership, thus consistently counting on GM’s funds during this period.
That is, despite its sub-par operating performance, one cannot claim that Saab was in financial
distress.
Another concern is that there were other events during, or around, the treatment period which
27This means that the Court which had access to all of Saab’s internal financial information, and granted Saab
its legal administration status also deemed the company healthy enough to continue operating. Not only did the
court deem Saab strong enough to continue operating but the ruling was arguably credible enough to restore buyers’
confidence in the brand.
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may have had a direct impact on Saab sales. We have tried to capture any event, which we have
not mentioned directly, by collectively combining news into indices and using these as additional
control variables in our robustness checks. We believe that this allows us to directly control for
any events that occurred to Saab before or after treatment which may have had additional impacts
on the sales of Saab.
5.2 Constructing Control Groups
Choosing a suitable control group with which to compare the outcome of the treated group is
largely dependent on the treatment group. In the current setting, the treatment group is the
carmaker Saab (and its products) while the treatment is that of being in financial distress.
To quantify the impact of Saab’s financial distress we need to construct a control group for
each of Saab’s products. Since consumers wish to purchase a car based on a fairly specific set of
needs, an adequate control group should consist of vehicles catering to the same consumer needs
as Saab models. That is, a control group should contain models which are close competitors to a
given Saab product in characteristic space (design, market segment, engine size etc.) and evolve
in a similar manner over time.28 29
One extreme case is to include only the single closest competitor of a given product in the
control group. However, this would leave the control group potentially exposed to idiosyncratic
events related to the very model included in it. On the other hand, having too many models in the
control group would wash out the effects local to the market category a given Saab model belongs
to.30 In other words, there is a clear trade-off regarding the size/composition of the control group.
To construct control groups we consider a market with J products andK characteristics denoted
by χkj, j = 1, .., J ; k = 1, ..., K, typically assumed exogenous in the demand literature. To make
characteristics of different magnitudes comparable we standardize each characteristic, denoted χ01j,
28We make sure that no models from other brands owned by General Motors are included in any of the control
groups used.
29Matching only on observable characteristics however means that those which are unobserved are not directly
accounted for. If unobservable characteristics consist primarily of brand –or model– reputation then these are
unlikely to vary greatly over time (as pointed out in e.g. Nevo (2001)).
30A further technical complication is that if you rebalance control groups annually with only a few elements, any
differences in the magnitudes of sales may cause jumps in the sales.
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subtracting it from its the mean and dividing the demeaned characteristic by its standard deviation.
For product j the vector of standardized product characteristics is given by χ0j =
(
χ01j, ..., χ
0
Kj
)′
.
With the above notation set, we need to define a distance between products i and j in characteristic
space to identify the closest competitors of each Saab product. One intuitive and convenient
measure is the (weighted) Euclidean distance defined as
∂ij =
[(
χ0i − χ0j
)′
W−1
(
χ0i − χ0j
)]1/2
where W is a weighting matrix potentially allowing for different weights according to the relevance
of characteristics.31 Essentially, product i will be identified as a close competitor of the treated
(Saab) product j whenever the distance between these two products is less than or equal to a
threshold level ∂∗. In our setting, we choose ∂∗ such that each Saab product has a control group
consisting of 10 competing products. A similar approach is used by Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008)
in their study of consumer goods prices following mergers whereby the authors construct control
groups out of “private label”, or store brand, products that are closest in characteristic space to
the products owned by merging parties.32
Control Group Composition We construct control groups for both gasoline and diesel versions
of Saab’s two models, the 9-3 and the 9-5.33 To make it into the control group, competitors have to
be in the same market segment, run on the same fuel and be close to a specific Saab model in terms
of its technical characteristics.34 Control groups are rebalanced every year using data from the
previous year only, so as to avoid forward-looking biases and account for product entry and exit -
31Here we use an equal weighting scheme when calculating the Euclidean distances between different products.
32The above strategy relates to two approaches commonly used in economics, namely the distance-metric (DM,
see Pinkse, Slade and Brett 2002) and the matching estimator (Cochran and Rubin 1973, Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983, Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). DM essentially views products as a unique combination of characteristics,
so substitution patterns across products are spatially determined, i.e. are determined by the relative proximity
between products in characteristic space. This allows replacing a multidimensional set of characteristics with a
summary statistic thereof, thus bypassing curse of dimensionality issues.
33Due to the small number of models available and the common technology (the Otto cycle engine), we coded
vehicles able to operate on both gasoline and ethanol as gasoline. This is consistent with the empirically observed
fact that substitution occurs mostly between gasoline and gasoline/ethanol cars, see Huse and Lucinda (2014) for
additional evidence of this substitution.
34More precisely, within a market segment, e.g. sedan, and fuel, e.g. diesel, we use continuous variables such as
engine power (horsepower, HP ), engine size (cubic centimeters, cm3), weight (kilograms, kg), emissions (gCO2/km),
mixed fuel economy (l/100km) and list price (SEK).
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see Table 3 for the control groups of models 9-3 and 9-5.35 As discussed in the Appendix, results are
robust to changes in the size and composition of the control group. While we report results using
equally-weighted elements of the control group, sales-weighted elements yield similar qualitative
results. Although there exists some degree of attrition in the control groups, it amounts to a small
share of the models from year to year. As a further robustness check, we perform the main analysis
with control groups that are not rebalanced, but instead retain their 2006 composition throughout
the entire sample period, with similar results.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Control groups for the Saab 9-3 and Saab 9-5 versions are displayed in Table 3. As reported in
Panel A, the main competitors of the Saab 9-3 running on gasoline across the years are the Skoda
Superb, the Toyota Avensis and the VW Jetta. Other close competitors include models such as
the Audi A4 and the Mazda 6. The results for the diesel version of the Saab 9-3 differ only slightly
from those of the gasoline one; besides the models above, the Honda Accord, the Kia Magentis
and the Peugeot 407 also often appear as competitors to the model.
Being larger than the Saab 9-3, it is no surprise that some of the models in the control group of
the Saab 9-5 are also slightly larger than those in the control groups for model 9-3. For instance,
besides the Skoda Superb, which also appears as a close competitor to the Saab 93, now models
such as the Audi A6 (which is larger than the Audi A4) and the Hyundai Sonata also appear as
close competitors to the Saab 9-5.36 37
Our approach is also closely related to the synthetic matching technique of Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal (2003), who propose constructing a control group with elements weighted in a way to provide
the best possible match between the treatment and control groups, pre-treatment. Although we
35While using characteristics from the same period rather than lagged ones does somewhat change the composition
of the control groups, the results remain qualitatively very similar. Using models from the previous (as opposed to
current) year arguably reflects more accurately the information set available to competitors when deciding about
their own product lines for a given year, thus being preferred in our analysis.
36In our analysis, we have not allowed products of any GM brand to enter the control group, but did not constrain
the presence of models produced by Chrysler. As a result, one Dodge (a subsidiary of Chrysler) product enters
the control group. As a robustness check, we also perform our analysis excluding it from the control group, with
marginal changes to the results.
37Although the control groups contain cars that may differ somewhat from a Saab product, there are very few
statistically significant differences between the average Saab and average control group vehicle as reported in Table
2.
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apply these synthetic matching methods in Section 6.1, we conduct our main analysis using control
groups constructed as described above for the following reasons. First, recall that the car market
witnesses a high number of products at any given point in time and episodes of entry, exit and
facelift of products, all of which are likely to alter the consumer’s perception of a product. Second,
the demand for automobiles often manifests itself through shifts in demand for particular market
segments, e.g. minivans, SUV’s; thus, we believe that our weighting scheme is more likely to
capture changing trends within the industry as a whole, rather than the trends of the individual
control group elements.
5.3 A First Look at the Data: Identification
To assess the appropriateness of the DD analysis, we argue that absent treatment, the sales of
Saab and the control group would have evolved in a similar manner. Formally, this amounts to
testing the parallel trends assumption between treatment and control groups. First, notice that
despite the noisiness, the sales of the Saab brand tend to follow the same pattern as that of the
control group in the years prior to its filing for administration, as displayed in Panel A of Figure
1. In particular, the seasonal patterns are well pronounced for both groups. Starting from early
2009, Saab’s sales are strongly affected whereas those of the control group follow an upward trend.
Despite its magnitude, this discrepancy is short-lived - as early as mid-2009 the sales of Saab once
again follow very closely those of the control group, in what coincides with the signature of Saab’s
purchase intent by Koenigsegg.38
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
When decomposing the Saab brand figures at the model level, it becomes apparent that the
behavior of Saab is driven mostly by its best-selling 9-3 model. In particular, although less pro-
nounced for the 9-5 model, the pre-administration sales of both models follow closely those of their
control groups, with sales of both models typically below the 100-unit threshold for most of the
38Although one could argue that this period also coincides with the end of the GCR, a policy which arguably
benefited Saab due to its emphasis on gasoline/ethanol flexible fuel vehicles, a segment where Saab operated, its
importance as compared to the end of administration is of second order. In fact, Huse and Lucinda (2014) shows
that Swedish and high-end German brands did not benefit from the GCR. Nevertheless, our conservative choice is
to still explicitly control for the GCR in our empirical specifications.
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administration period. Moreover, for all Panels in Figure 1, the sales of the treatment group are
notable more volatile than those of the control groups. The smoothness in the sales of the control
group are a direct consequence of the averaging of the sales of a number of products. However,
we still fail to reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends between sales of treatment and control
groups in the pre-treatment period, the key identifying assumption in the DD setting. In order to
check whether this assumption is satisfied, we estimate a triple difference specification to assess the
parallel trends assumption. More specifically, we interact a time trend with the treatment group
and a dummy for the pre-treatment period.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 reports results for the Saab brand in Column 1, for the Saab 9-3 in Column 2 and
for the Saab 9-5 in Column 3. For each case we consider the specification with the full set of
controls, i.e. the GCR indicator, the consumer confidence measure and the interaction of product
introduction and month fixed-effects. Additionally, in Section 6.1 we provide robustness checks
using synthetically constructed groups as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) whereby sales of the
treatment group are replicated as closely as possible using the weighted sales of all other models.
In this setting, the treatment and control group sales are very closely related pre-treatment but
fall for Saab in the treatment period. All these results lend support to the finding that, absent
treatment, the sales of Saab and the control groups would have evolved in a similar manner, thus
lending credence to the DD analysis we perform.
5.4 Results
To quantify consumer response to Saab’s financial distress, we estimate DD regressions using sales
as the dependent variable. We estimate such regressions both for the Saab brand as a whole and
for its products separately.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 reports results for the Saab sales as compared to the control groups defined above,
both for Saab as a brand as well as for the Saab 9-3 and the Saab 9-5 separately. To construct
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the overall brand level control group we first construct control groups for each individual Saab
model-fuel combination, as noted above, and then aggregate these into a single brand level control
group. Our benchmark specification is given by
y∗it = θi + µ∗t + TtGiδ∗ + x
′
itβ + uit (8)
where t = 1, ..., T are time periods, y∗it are sales of treated (the Saab brand, a Saab 9-3 or a Saab
9-5 model, depending on the specification) and untreated groups, Gi takes on a value of one if
the observation is a treated subject and zero otherwise, whereas Tt takes on a value of one for
observations falling within the treatment period between November 2008 and August 2009 and
zero otherwise, and xit is a set of controls including fixed effects for the Green Car Rebate, month
interacted with the number of new car models introduced a given year as well as a consumer
confidence index.39 The DD estimator is given by δ∗ and the model is estimated using ordinary
least squares.
Columns 1 through 3 in Table 5 report results that differ with respect to treatment group used.
DD coefficients are negative and significant throughout. The table shows the upper and lower
bounds, δ¯ and δ respectively which correspond to the estimated end-points of the inequality given
by equation (5). If we are to assume perfect substitution, that is λ = 1, then the true treatment
effect would be correctly estimated by δ¯ whereas, if λ = 0, or no substitution, then the true
treatment effect would instead be correctly estimated by δ.40 The confidence intervals reported
are 95% block bootstrapped confidence intervals obtained by block bootstrapping five hundred
samples. We choose block bootstrapping in order to account for potential serial correlation in the
errors terms, something earlier applications of the DD applications were criticized for not doing
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). Although another alternative would be to use some
form of standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals, it
has been suggested that these perform poorly in small samples. See the Appendix for additional
39One reason to include month fixed-effects is to account for potential difference between list and transaction
prices.
40By proposition 2, the refined bounds may be narrower than the bounds assuming perfect or no substitution,
as the nature of demand may significantly restrict the possible values of λ. To be conservative, however, we choose
not to present the refined bounds.
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details and robustness checks.
Column 1 reports results of the specification for sales of the Saab brand as a whole. The
treatment effect is bounded between -261.06 and -237.33 units, and is statistically significant at
the 95 percent significance level. Given unconditional average monthly sales of 470 units between
2005 and late 2008, these results suggest a drop in the sales of Saab products of between 50 and
56 percent.
Columns 2 and 3, report a more disaggregated analysis focusing on Saab models 9-3 and 9-5,
respectively. Since the 9-3 was Saab’s best-selling product during the sample period, it is not
surprising that it suffers the bulk of consumer reactions: while column 2 estimates are in the range
of a 150-200 unit reduction in sales, those in column 3 are closer to a 50 unit decrease. Column
2 estimates for the Saab 9-3 suggest a treatment effect in the range between -204.30 and -185.73
units - a drop of between 61 and 67 percent given unconditional average monthly sales of 304 units
between 2005 and late 2008.
The DD results for model 9-5, reported in column 3 of Table 5, follow a path similar to that of
the Saab 9-3 with a treatment effect bounded between -57.17 and -51.97 units. Given unconditional
average monthly sales of 151 units between 2005 and late 2008, these results suggest a drop in the
sales of Saab products of between 34 and 38 percent. A lower decline in the sales Saab 9-5 may
be due to the Saab 9-5 being even older than the Saab 9-3 in terms of technology and because of
this having a more loyal following from consumers.
All in all, consumer responses are not only statistically but also economically significant with
the bounds providing evidence that, even in the worst case of full substitution towards the control
group, consumers did react to the financial ills of Saab.
5.5 Supply Effects
One important challenge faced in the analysis of the effects of financial distress on firm performance
is disentangling demand from supply effects. For instance, in the automobile industry a firm in
financial difficulties may fire employees or cut production in order to improve revenues or better
utilize production capacity. Even if the producer’s actions were to remain the same, the dealers
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that sell the cars on to consumers may choose to stop transacting the cars because of the risk
that at some point consumers stop purchasing the car altogether and the dealer is left with an
initially expensive asset that becomes worthless. Further, suppliers of parts used in manufacturing
may choose to stop supplying to firms in financial distress making it more and more difficult to
keep production levels constant. All of these scenarios would potentially affect the supply of cars
available for purchase and lead to a drop in sales - not because consumers do not want to buy the
car but because they simply cannot.
In Sweden, unlike for example in the United States, dealers do not keep a large inventory with
consumers instead having to order the exact vehicle they want to buy. This means that as long as
Saab continued producing cars, consumers would still be able to go to a dealer and order the car
that they wanted to buy with the dealer not being exposed to the risk of initially having to buy
the vehicle and then being unable to sell it at a later point in time.41
Moreover, despite production at Saab being halted during the period it was under administra-
tion, this happened for only a single week in February 2009. Production was halted as Saab was
unable to pay Swedish customs import duties for parts arriving from overseas suppliers. As soon
as Saab had obtained liquid funds to pay the import duties, production resumed with no other
interruptions taking place in 2009.42 43 Additionally, we have found no evidence that inventories
of already manufactured Saab cars dwindled and were unable to cover demand. Furthermore, as
seen from Figure 1, both the Saab 9-3 and 9-5 saw sales improving slightly towards the summer
of 2009 with, for instance, the sales of the Saab 9-5 reaching levels better than those seen in early
2008. This suggests that there was enough of a supply to satisfy consumers once their demand
improved.
Analysis of Vehicle Prices To support the above analysis, we perform a difference-in-differences
analysis comparing the list prices of Saab cars to those of a control group to assess whether there
41See Huse and Lucinda (2014) for a more detailed description on the ordering of cars in Sweden.
42Although it was noted in the Swedish media that certain smaller suppliers did end up going bankrupt, we found
no further evidence regarding issues with Saab not being able to manufacture cars because suppliers had stopped
supplying parts.
43As an additional robustness check, we test whether the list prices of Saab vehicles changed as compared to
control group. These are included in the Appendix.
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was any reaction in prices from the part of Saab.44 Table 6 reports separate results for Saab as
a brand and for its models 9-3 and 9-5 using two different control groups.45 First, we use the
standard control groups described above for the sake of consistency with the remaining of our
analysis. Second, we perform a robustness check whereby we construct control groups containing
all products in the same market segment as the Saab products.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
The results in Table 6 document a lack of response in prices for Saab as a whole and for model
9-3, see Columns 1 and 2, respectively. However, the same does not hold for model 9-5, see Column
3. The reason why the significance of the price reactions for Saab 9-5 do not translate into price
reactions for Saab as a whole is the small share of sales commanded by model 9-5 within the Saab
brand. These results, hold also for our alternative definition of control group, compare Columns 1
and 4, 2 and 5, 3 and 6.
Our interpretation of the above findings is as follows. In the case of the Saab 9-3, its supply
curve is largely flat – inelastic to changes in quantities – due to the very fact that such model was
the leading product of the Saab brand. In contrast, the supply curve of the already dated Saab
9-5 was upward-sloping, with the company accepting to lower its price in order to make up for,
say, the lack of technology improvements and the dated layout.46
The fact that we find no significant difference between Saab prices and the prices of other cars
may be due to prices being mismeasured, leading to an underestimated effect. We do not believe
that our results are driven by attenuation bias but rather that the results correctly reflect that
Saab’s list prices did not change significantly as compared to that of other cars.
All in all, the reactions we document – no statistical evidence of price reactions for the Saab
brand as a whole coupled with a roughly 50% reduction in sales – show the large economic impact
of financial distress on the revenues (and thus profits) of a company.
44Since vehicles are effectively ordered in the Swedish market, there is little room for bargaining upon the purchase
of a new vehicle, making list prices (Manufacturer Recommended Sale Prices, MRSPs) a good proxy for actual
transaction prices in the new vehicle market, see Huse and Lucinda (2014) for details.
45Recall that that model 9-3 is the best-selling Saab product, commanding about 80% of the brand sales.
46See the Supplementary Appendix for a discussion of the technological lagardness of Saab’s products.
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6 Robustness
This section reports selected robustness tests used to assess the maintained assumptions of the
analysis above. The Supplementary Appendix reports results of a number of additional robustness
checks.
6.1 Synthetic Control Groups
We examine whether our main results are robust to constructing a control group according to the
synthetic matching methodology of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).
The synthetic control method allows estimating the effect of a treatment when a single unit
(Saab, in our case) is exposed to such treatment. It consists of a data-driven methodology to
construct synthetic control units based on a convex combination of untreated units which ap-
proximates the characteristics of the treated unit. For instance, in the case of Saab one would
intuitively expect that the synthetic control group would consist of vehicle models which closely
compete with Saab, due to their reputation or observable characteristics such as size. Such models
would be weighted in a way that the combination mimics as closely as possible the behaviour of
Saab sales pre-treatment in order to conduct inference for the post-treatment period.
Despite being somewhat similar, a few key distinctions exist between the construction of control
groups presented in Section 5, and that presented in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). Whereas we
construct control groups by matching Saab products to close competitors using only car character-
istics, restricting these to the 10 closest competitors, the method of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
allows choosing the control group so as to synthetically match both the sales and car characteris-
tics of the control group as closely as possible to that of the treatment group in the pre-treatment
period.
We conduct the robustness check by constructing three types of synthetic control groups,
namely (i) using only car characteristics; (ii) using only car sales; and (iii) using both car char-
acteristics and sales in order to make these results comparable to the ones presented in the main
analysis - see Appendix C for details. Furthermore, we also redo the exercise for another GM
brand, Opel, in order to determine whether other GM brands also experienced similar effects of
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financial distress as those observed in Saab.
Results of Synthetic Matching We construct synthetic control groups based on each of the
three methods described above focusing on Saab’s most popular model, the Saab 9-3. The matching
is carried out using all 90 competing products available before 2009 that were within the same
market segments, excluding other Saab products.47 As the control group elements are no longer
weighted equally, and as there is a much larger number of control group elements, we shall assume
that substitution between the treatment and control group is not an issue and estimate a DD
specification without taking substitution into account.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
From Specifications 1 and 2 in Table 7, we see that when comparing the sales of the Saab 9-3
to those of a synthetic control group constructed using only standardized and equally-important
product characteristics, the results are very similar to the main results where we construct control
groups using proximity in characteristic space as the criterion for choosing the elements of the
control group. Perhaps this is unsurprising as there are only a few differences in how the two
control groups are constructed; the methodology of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) assigns weight
by replicating the characteristics of the treated product as closely as possible from the entire
universe of competing products, whereas the methodology presented in this paper equally weights
the elements that are closest in characteristic space.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
As seen from the top panel of Figure 2, the synthetic control group does not perfectly replicate
the sales of treated products in the pre-treatment period as information regarding sales is excluded
in the construction of the synthetic control group. As a direct comparison, the bottom panel of
Figure 2 shows sales for the Saab 9-3 and a synthetic control group which is constructed in order to
replicate the sales of the Saab 9-3 in the pre-treatment period. We see that the sales of the Saab 9-3
and the sales of the synthetic control group are very similar in the pre-treatment period, diverging
significantly in the post-treatment period. This is confirmed by the regression results presented
47As with the main results, other GM brands are not allowed to be part of the control group.
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in Specifications 3 to 5 of Table 7, from which we can conclude that there are no statistically
significant pre-treatment differences in outcomes between the treatment group and the control
group but that there is a significant difference in post-treatment outcomes.48
Distress of Other General Motors Brands We also perform the synthetic matching exercise
using another GM brand, Opel, the best-selling GM brand in Sweden. Similarly to Saab, Opel
may itself have experienced a decline in sales due to the financial distress of GM. Whereas Saab’s
future was uncertain, largely due to GM’s announcement that Saab was to be made independent
and that it would no longer be a part of GM, Opel was to remain an integral part of GM as part of
a slimmer GM. Despite this, as GM’s future as whole was uncertain in late 2008, this uncertainty
may have affected the sales of Opel. However, if consumers were to have stopped buying Opel cars
due to uncertainty of the financial situation of GM, we should expect the effect to have at least
partly disappeared with the effective bailout of GM in June 2009.49
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Looking at Specifications 5 and 6 in Table 7, we see that sales of Opel’s best selling model, the
Opel Astra, do also decline as compared to their synthetic control groups. However, what is more
important, see Figure 3, sales of the Opel Astra recover almost immediately following the bailout
of GM. The above findings are consistent with our line of reasoning in several dimensions. First,
Saab was not the only brand to suffer a decline in sales due to GM’s failing financial health. That
is, consumers, do react to the perception that a company is in ill financial health.
Second, the effects were different for Opel and Saab due to their differential status in GM’s
restructured brand portfolio - while Saab was to be made independent, Opel was to remain one of
GM’s core brands.
Finally, the fact that Opel sales rebound so markedly from June 2009 suggests that supply was
not a large factor driving the decline in Opel sales. That is, the effect was in most part demand-
driven. This fact lends additional credibility to our arguments that the decline in Saab sales was
not caused by supply effects but rather demand effects.
48As before, we cannot reject the parallel trends assumption pre-treatment.
49For the sake of comparison, we will assign the same treatment window for Opel as that of Saab. Restricting
the window to coincide with GM’s financial distress - that is November 2008 to June 2009, strengthens the results.
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6.2 Negative Spillovers
In this paper, we focus on positive spillovers from Saab, a treated firm, to the control group. It
may also be the case Saab’s financial distress spilled over onto the control group or the whole
market in a negative way, inducing buyers to postpone the purchase of a car or not purchasing a
car altogether. Assuming that the potential number of total buyers is stable across time, then,
controlling for other factors, any decline in the total number of control group cars sold during
the post-treatment period would indicate that buyers of control group cars may also have been
affected.
To test whether there was any negative spillover from Saab’s financial distress, we proceed as
in Huse & Lucinda (2014) who estimate whether the market share of the outside good in Sweden
increased due to the Green Car Rebate (GCR). We estimate the spillover effect by regressing the
total number of control group cars sold during our sample period on our baseline control variables
and a post-treatment period dummy. A significant post-treatment period dummy would suggest
that after controlling for general time trends, seasonality and economic confidence, there was an
additional change in sales due to there being a treatment effect spilling over from Saab onto the
control group.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
As reported in Column 1 of Table 8, we find a point estimate which indicates that, during the
treatment period, there was an additional decline of roughly 27 units for the Saab brand control
group. For the Saab 9-3 control group, the point estimate in Column 2 suggests that during the
treatment period there were roughly 15 fewer units sold and for the 9-5 control group roughly
7 fewer units sold as seen in Column 3. However, none of these point estimates are statistically
significant. Further, we conduct the same analysis for the entire market in Column 4 of Table 8
and find that although there was an indication of there being roughly 700 fewer units sold during
Saab’s treatment period, this estimate is also statistically insignificant. These results suggest that
if there were negative spillovers due to Saab’s financial distress, such effects were quite small.
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6.3 Placebo Tests
We conduct two sets of placebo tests to assess whether there were significant differences between
treatment and control groups, pre-treatment. The first placebo test considers a treatment period
between January 2008 and October 2008, that is, a treatment period of exactly the same length,
exactly prior to the beginning of the treatment period used in the paper. The second placebo test
considers a treatment period between between February and November 2007, thus ending one year
prior to the start of the main treatment window used.
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
For each case we consider the specification with the full set of controls, i.e. the GCR indicator, the
consumer confidence measure and the interaction of product introduction and month fixed-effects.
Table 9 reports results for the Saab brand in Column 1, for the Saab 9-3 in Column 2 and for the
Saab 9-5 in Column 3. The results consistently show the lack of significant differences between
treatment and control groups, pre-treatment. Although insignificant, the results of the first placebo
test suggest there may have been a decline in Saab sales in the months prior to treatment.
6.4 Additional Robustness Tests
We have conducted a number of additional robustness checks; we have explored whether the decline
in Saab sales was the result of increased promotional activity on behalf of other brands trying to
use Saab’s situation to increase their own sales. To account for the potential that some brands
may have increased their promotional activity in order to gain market share at the time Saab was
experiencing financial distress we assume that the two models within each control group that had
the highest percentual increase in sales between 2008 and 2009 would have been the models that
saw a large increase in promotional activity. We drop these two models and re-estimate the models
with the remaining eight models in each control group and we find that the treatment effects are
smaller but still statistically significant.
Further, we look at the extent to which news coverage and technological laggardness can explain
the drop in sales observed for Saab and its products. We have also constructed control groups
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using fewer or more elements, leaving the control groups fixed rather than rebalancing them on
a yearly basis. We find that the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the main
specifications.
We have also looked at different time-frames for the treatment window and run Granger Causal-
ity tests to test exogeneity of treatment whereby lagged sales are able to predict the probability
of being treated. We find that increasing the treatment window length increases our results but
that lagged sales are not able to predict being treated in the future.
A full description and discussion of the robustness checks can be found in the Supplementary
Appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how consumers respond to the financial problems of Swedish carmaker
Saab. Our empirical strategy consists of matching Saab products to a set of close competitors
and performing a difference-in-differences analysis. We match the Saab products to other vehicles
based on product characteristics and aggregate up to construct the control group for the Saab
brand.
On the methodological front, we show that substitution from Saab products to those of the
control group will lead to an overestimation of the true treatment effect. Assuming that all
consumers substituting away from Saab either purchase a vehicle in the control group or opt for
the outside good, we show that the true treatment effect can be bounded. What is more, since the
substitutability between products is at the root of the overestimation of the DD effect, we provide
conditions under which the bounds depend on own- and cross-price elasticities of the products
considered and not on the number of control group elements.
Our bounds provide a way to look at difference-in-differences methods in settings where treat-
ment affects both treatment and control groups, an issue recently discussed by Angrist and Pischke
(2010) and Nevo and Whinston (2010) in the context of Industrial Organization and Antitrust,
but which should also be applicable to other fields.
Our findings are robust to changes in the treatment window, control groups and control vari-
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ables. This lends further support to the conclusions of previous studies according to which con-
sumers do worry about void warranties, difficulties in securing spare parts and qualified service.
While the qualitative results of this paper are similar to that of the studies by Hammond
(2013a) and Hortaçsu et al (2013), we focus on the primary market. Given both institutional and
empirical evidence that prices in the Swedish new vehicle market are well-behaved, our analysis
allows to infer how a firm will be affected by financial distress. In fact, we find a significant drop in
Saab’s monthly sales amounting to 50-56 percent of average pre-treatment sales, which will likely
be larger for firms not benefiting from home-bias, as seems to be the case of Saab.
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Tables and Figures
Sales Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . . . (10)
Year Volvo Toyota Peugeot Volkswagen Ford . . . Saab
2006 15.38% 9.38% 9.45% 7.63% 5.93% . . . 5.25%
Panel A: Market Shares 2007 17.42% 9.47% 9.32% 7.15% 5.80% . . . 4.11%
2008 12.44% 10.99% 8.48% 8.35% 5.48% . . . 3.74%
2009 14.77% 12.29% 5.69% 6.88% 5.69% . . . 1.66%
2006-2009 15.20% 10.34% 8.46% 7.50% 5.74% . . . 3.87%
Year Volvo Toyota Peugeot Volkswagen Ford . . . Saab
2006 21,468 13,091 13,198 10,648 8,281 . . . 7,330
Panel B: Sales 2007 26,345 14,323 14,104 10,814 8,779 . . . 6,218
2008 14,144 12,492 9,642 9,493 6,233 . . . 4,247
2009 14,414 11,999 5,549 6,718 5,554 . . . 1,619
2006-2009 76,371 51,905 42,493 37,673 28,847 19,414
Table 1: Annual market shares and sales volumes of the five most frequently purchased car brands in Sweden together with tenth best
selling brand for 2006-2009, Saab. Panel A: Annual market shares of the five most frequently purchased car brands in Sweden together
with tenth best selling brand Saab; Panel B: Annual sales volume of the five most frequently purchased car brands in Sweden together
with the tenth best selling brand Saab.
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Saab 9-3 Saab 9-5
Year 2008 2009 2008 2009
1 Audi A4 Alfa Romeo 159 Alfa Romeo 159 Alfa Romeo 159
2 Dodge Avenger Dodge Avenger Audi A4 Audi A6
3 Honda Accord Honda Accord Audi A6 Dodge Avenger
4 Kia Magentis Kia Magentis Dodge Avenger Honda Accord
Panel A: Gasoline 5 Mazda 6 Peugeot 407 Hyundai Sonata Hyundai Sonata
6 Renault Laguna Skoda Superb Mazda 6 Kia Magentis
7 Skoda Superb Subaru Legacy Skoda Superb Peugeot 407
8 Toyota Avensis Toyota Avensis Subaru Forester Skoda Superb
9 Volkswagen Jetta Volkswagen Jetta Subaru Legacy Subaru Legacy
10 Volkswagen Passat Volkswagen Passat Volkswagen Passat Volkswagen Passat
Saab 9-3 Saab 9-5
Year 2008 2009 2008 2009
1 Audi A4 Alfa Romeo 159 Alfa Romeo 159 Alfa Romeo 159
2 Dodge Avenger Audi A4 Audi A4 Audi A6
3 Honda Accord Honda Accord Audi A6 Dodge Avenger
4 Kia Magentis Kia Magentis Dodge Avenger Hyundai Sonata
Panel B: Diesel 5 Mazda 6 Mazda 6 Hyundai Sonata Jaguar X-Type
6 Peugeot 407 Peugeot 407 Kia Magentis Kia Magentis
7 Renault Laguna Subaru Legacy Lexus Is Lexus Is
8 Toyota Avensis Toyota Avensis Peugeot 607 Skoda Superb
9 Volkswagen Jetta Volkswagen Jetta Skoda Superb Subaru Legacy
10 Volkswagen Passat Volvo S80 Volkswagen Passat Volvo S80
Table 3: Control group elements disaggregated by year, model (Saab 9-3 and 9-5) and fuel type. A single control group is separately
constructed for each of the two Saab car models as well as for each year from 2006 to 2009 and each fuel type. Elements of the control
group are chosen to be as close as possible in characteristics space to the characteristics of any given Saab car model. Each control group
contains 10 other cars chosen from all possible cars available on the Swedish market between 2005 and 2009. Only models available in
a previous year are allowed to be included into a control group. Panel A: Control group for Saab’s gasoline models; Panel B: Control
group for Saab’s diesel models.
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(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Saab brand sales Saab 9-3 sales Saab 9-5 sales
Sample Period 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12
Trend x Treatment x Pre-treatment Period
-5.27 -3.49 -1.79
[-2602.76, 2145.29] [-957.63, 1525.33] [-518.56, 703.84]
GCR FE X X X
Consumer Confidence X X X
Month x Introductions FE:s X X X
Observations 96 96 96
R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.92
Table 4: Results for triple difference specifications to test the parallel trends assumption. The coefficient of interest is a triple interaction
term between a time trend and dummies for the treatment group and the pre-treatment period. Specification 1 shows the parallel trends
test for the Saab 9-3, Specification 2 for the Saab 9-5 and Specification 3 for Saab as a brand. 95% heteroskedasticity-robust confidence
intervals are reported within square brackets. The null of parallel trends is not rejected for any of (1)-(3).
51
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
Va
ri
ab
le
Sa
ab
br
an
d
sa
le
s
Sa
ab
9-
3
sa
le
s
Sa
ab
9-
5
sa
le
s
Sa
m
pl
e
Pe
ri
od
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
B
ou
nd
ed
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
E
ffe
ct
:
[ δ,δ¯]
[-
26
1.
06
,
-2
37
.3
3]
[-
20
4.
30
,
-1
85
.7
3]
[-
57
.1
7,
-5
1.
97
]
[-4
38
.4
6,
-1
42
.2
2]
[-3
05
.1
9,
-1
01
.8
2]
[-1
05
.4
0,
-2
3.
94
]
G
C
R
FE
X
X
X
C
on
su
m
er
C
on
fid
en
ce
X
X
X
M
on
th
x
In
tr
od
uc
tio
ns
FE
:s
X
X
X
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
96
96
96
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
76
6
0.
75
7
0.
71
6
Ta
bl
e
5:
R
es
ul
ts
of
D
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-D
iff
er
en
ce
s
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
4
an
d
gi
ve
n
by
y
it
=
θ i
+
µ
t
+
T
t
G
i
δ
+
x
′ it
β
+
u
it
co
m
pa
ri
ng
th
e
sa
le
s
of
th
e
Sa
ab
br
an
d
(1
),
an
d
its
tw
o
pr
od
uc
ts
(2
)
an
d
(3
),
to
th
e
sa
le
s
of
th
e
re
le
va
nt
,a
nn
ua
lly
-r
eb
al
an
ce
d
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
in
or
de
r
to
m
ea
su
re
th
e
eff
ec
t
of
fin
an
ci
al
di
st
re
ss
on
Sa
ab
sa
le
s.
T
he
tr
ea
tm
en
t
w
in
do
w
is
de
fin
ed
to
be
be
tw
ee
n
N
ov
em
be
r
20
08
to
A
ug
us
t
20
09
.
T
he
st
ar
t
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
pe
ri
od
co
in
ci
de
s
w
ith
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
pr
ob
le
m
s
of
Sa
ab
’s
pa
re
nt
co
m
pa
ny
G
en
er
al
M
ot
or
s
be
co
m
in
g
pu
bl
ic
.
T
he
en
d
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
pe
ri
od
co
in
ci
de
s
w
ith
a
Sw
ed
is
h
co
ur
t
en
di
ng
Sa
ab
’s
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
st
at
us
.
E
ac
h
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
co
nt
ai
ns
a
ve
ct
or
of
ad
di
tio
na
lc
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
th
e
G
re
en
C
ar
R
eb
at
e,
m
on
th
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
ith
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ne
w
ca
r
m
od
el
s
in
tr
od
uc
ed
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
as
w
el
la
s
a
co
ns
um
er
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
de
x.
T
he
es
tim
at
ed
lo
w
er
an
d
up
pe
r
bo
un
ds
fo
r
th
e
tr
ue
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
δ
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
[ δ,δ¯]
ab
ov
e
in
bo
ld
.
B
el
ow
ea
ch
co
effi
ci
en
t
an
d
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
bo
un
ds
,9
5%
bl
oc
k
bo
ot
st
ra
pp
ed
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
.
52
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
up
s
C
ar
s
A
ll
C
ar
s
w
ith
in
Se
gm
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
Va
ri
ab
le
Sa
ab
br
an
d
pr
ic
es
Sa
ab
9-
3
pr
ic
es
Sa
ab
9-
5
pr
ic
es
Sa
ab
br
an
d
pr
ic
es
Sa
ab
9-
3
pr
ic
es
Sa
ab
9-
5
pr
ic
es
Sa
m
pl
e
Pe
ri
od
20
06
-2
00
9
20
06
-2
00
9
20
06
-2
00
9
20
06
-2
00
9
20
06
-2
00
9
20
06
-2
00
9
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
×
Po
st
-1
3,
04
3
-4
,7
42
-1
9,
76
7
-1
0,
86
5
-2
,4
21
-1
9,
31
0
[-2
7,
57
0,
14
,8
42
]
[-3
0,
18
6,
20
,7
02
]
[-2
8,
26
9,
-1
1,
26
5]
[-2
3,
62
5,
1,
89
4]
[-2
3,
04
5,
18
,2
03
]
[-2
6,
56
6,
-1
2,
05
4]
Ye
ar
FE
:s
X
X
X
X
X
X
Fu
el
T
yp
e
FE
:s
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
14
1
96
95
58
2
57
0
57
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
93
8
0.
90
6
0.
97
4
0.
98
0
0.
98
0
0.
98
0
Ta
bl
e
6:
R
es
ul
ts
of
D
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-D
iff
er
en
ce
s
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
fo
r
pr
ic
es
of
Sa
ab
ca
rs
ag
ai
ns
t
pr
ic
es
of
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
ca
rs
.
R
es
ul
ts
ar
e
fo
r
pr
ic
es
of
Sa
ab
br
an
d
as
a
w
ho
le
(1
),
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
3
(2
)
an
d
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
5
(3
)
as
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
re
le
va
nt
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
an
d
fo
r
pr
ic
es
of
Sa
ab
br
an
d
as
a
w
ho
le
(4
),
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
3
(5
)
an
d
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
5
(6
)
as
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
pr
ic
es
of
al
l
ve
hi
cl
es
av
ai
la
bl
e
w
ith
in
th
e
sa
m
e
se
gm
en
t.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
ye
ar
an
d
fu
el
ty
pe
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
95
%
ro
bu
st
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s.
53
Sa
ab
9-
3
O
pe
lA
st
ra
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
up
Sa
le
s
B
as
el
in
e
Sy
nt
h.
C
ha
rs
.
O
nl
y
Sy
nt
h.
Sa
le
s
O
nl
y
Sy
nt
h.
C
ha
rs
.
+
Sa
le
s
Sy
nt
h.
C
ha
rs
.
O
nl
y
Sy
nt
h.
Sa
le
s
O
nl
y
Sa
m
pl
e
Pe
ri
od
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
06
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
×
Po
st
:
δ
-2
02
.2
8
-2
21
.4
4
-9
2.
24
-2
02
.9
2
-1
27
.7
2
-4
8.
11
[-2
80
.3
1,
-1
24
.2
6]
[-2
96
.9
4,
-1
45
.9
4]
[-1
72
.3
9,
-1
2.
08
]
[-2
77
.9
1,
-1
27
.9
4]
[-1
71
.5
3,
-8
3.
91
]
[-9
4.
71
,-
1.
51
]
G
C
R
FE
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
on
su
m
er
C
on
fid
en
ce
X
X
X
X
X
X
M
on
th
x
In
tr
od
uc
tio
ns
FE
:s
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
96
96
96
96
96
96
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
76
4
0.
75
9
0.
65
0
0.
70
6
0.
82
3
0.
78
4
Ta
bl
e
7:
R
es
ul
ts
of
D
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-D
iff
er
en
ce
s
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
6
w
he
re
co
nt
ro
l
gr
ou
ps
ar
e
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
th
e
sy
nt
he
tic
m
at
ch
in
g
m
et
ho
d
of
A
ba
di
e
an
d
G
ar
de
az
ab
al
(2
00
3)
m
at
ch
ed
on
ca
r
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
sa
le
s
an
d
bo
th
.
T
he
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
is
gi
ve
n
by
y
it
=
θ i
+
µ
t
+
T
t
G
i
δ
+
x
′ it
β
+
u
it
co
m
pa
ri
ng
th
e
sa
le
s
of
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
3
(s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
1
th
ro
ug
h
4,
w
ith
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
1
us
in
g
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
fo
r
th
e
Sa
ab
9-
3
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
th
e
m
ai
n
te
xt
)
an
d
O
pe
lA
st
ra
(s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
5
an
d
6)
to
th
e
sa
le
s
of
th
e
re
le
va
nt
,
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
in
or
de
r
to
m
ea
su
re
th
e
eff
ec
t
of
fin
an
ci
al
di
st
re
ss
on
Sa
ab
an
d
O
pe
ls
al
es
.
T
he
tr
ea
tm
en
t
w
in
do
w
is
de
fin
ed
to
be
be
tw
ee
n
N
ov
em
be
r
20
08
to
A
ug
us
t
20
09
.
T
he
st
ar
t
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
pe
ri
od
co
in
ci
de
s
w
ith
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
pr
ob
le
m
s
of
Sa
ab
’s
pa
re
nt
co
m
pa
ny
G
en
er
al
M
ot
or
s
be
co
m
in
g
pu
bl
ic
.
T
he
en
d
of
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
pe
ri
od
co
in
ci
de
s
w
ith
a
Sw
ed
is
h
co
ur
t
en
di
ng
Sa
ab
’s
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
st
at
us
.
E
ac
h
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
co
nt
ai
ns
a
ve
ct
or
of
ad
di
tio
na
lc
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
in
g
fix
ed
-e
ffe
ct
s
fo
r
th
e
G
re
en
C
ar
R
eb
at
e,
m
on
th
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
ith
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ne
w
ca
r
m
od
el
s
in
tr
od
uc
ed
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
as
w
el
la
s
a
co
ns
um
er
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
de
x.
T
he
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
m
ay
be
aff
ec
te
d
by
an
in
di
re
ct
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
4
bu
t
is
di
sr
eg
ar
de
d
in
th
is
ca
se
as
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
s
ar
e
sy
nt
he
tic
al
ly
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d.
B
el
ow
ea
ch
co
effi
ci
en
t
an
d
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t,
95
%
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
-r
ob
us
t
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
.
54
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
Va
ri
ab
le
B
ra
nd
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
up
Sa
le
s
9-
3
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
up
Sa
le
s
9-
5
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
up
Sa
le
s
To
ta
lM
ar
ke
t
Sa
le
s
Sa
m
pl
e
Pe
ri
od
20
05
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
05
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
05
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
20
05
-0
1/
20
09
-1
2
Po
st
-T
re
at
m
en
t
Pe
ri
od
-2
7.
59
-1
4.
69
-7
.0
8
-6
96
.9
8
[-7
0.
60
,1
5.
43
]
[-4
2.
30
,1
2.
92
]
[-3
9.
54
,2
5.
39
]
[-2
,0
24
.6
1,
63
0.
65
]
M
on
th
FE
:s
X
M
on
th
x
In
tr
od
uc
tio
ns
FE
:s
X
X
X
T
im
e
Tr
en
d
X
X
X
X
C
on
su
m
er
C
on
fid
en
ce
X
X
X
X
G
C
R
FE
X
X
X
X
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
60
60
60
60
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
88
0.
85
0.
75
0.
87
Ta
bl
e
8:
R
es
ul
ts
of
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
gi
ve
n
by
y
t
=
µ
t
+
T
t
γ
+
x
′ tβ
+
u
t
tr
yi
ng
to
m
ea
su
re
an
y
sp
ill
ov
er
of
Sa
ab
’s
fin
an
ci
al
di
st
re
ss
on
to
ta
lc
ar
sa
le
s
in
th
e
Sw
ed
is
h
m
ar
ke
t,
th
at
is
,w
he
th
er
th
er
e
w
as
a
ne
ga
tiv
e
sp
ill
ov
er
fr
om
Sa
ab
on
to
th
e
Sa
ab
br
an
d
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
or
to
ta
lc
ar
s
sa
le
s.
T
he
co
effi
ci
en
t
of
in
te
re
st
is
γ
an
d
m
ea
su
re
w
he
th
er
,c
on
tr
ol
lin
g
fo
r
m
on
th
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
co
ns
um
er
co
nfi
de
nc
e
m
ea
su
re
s
an
d
a
G
C
R
fix
ed
eff
ec
t,
to
ta
lc
ar
sa
le
s
in
Sw
ed
en
fe
ll
du
ri
ng
th
e
po
st
-t
re
at
m
en
t
pe
ri
od
.
95
%
ro
bu
st
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s.
In
tr
od
uc
ti
on
va
ri
ab
le
ex
cl
ud
ed
in
C
ol
um
n
(4
)
as
it
w
as
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
fo
r
ea
ch
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
bu
t
no
t
fo
r
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
as
a
w
ho
le
.
55
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Saab brand sales Saab 9-3 sales Saab 9-5 sales
Sample Period 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12
Placebo Test 1:
Bounded Treatment Effect:
[
δ, δ¯
] [-168.23, -152.94] [-548.90, -499.00] [-349.20, -317.46]
[-828.88, 375.19] [-230.71, 863.01] [-984.82, 7625.58]
Placebo Test 2:
Bounded Treatment Effect:
[
δ, δ¯
] [23.21, -] [-13.49, -12.26] [2.35, -]
[-110.22, 237.60] [-69.31, 46.51] [-158.64, 652.79]
GCR FE X X X
Consumer Confidence X X X
Month x Introductions FE:s X X X
Observations 76 76 76
Table 9: Results of placebo tests to check whether there were significant differences between treatment and control groups pre-treatment.
The estimation window excludes the true treatment window. Placebo test 1 is for the period 2008-01/2008-10, thus exactly prior to
the true treatment window, whereas Placebo test 2 is set to 2007-02/2007-11 or ending a year prior to the start of the true treatment
window. Difference-in-Differences specifications described in Section 4 and given by yit = θi + µt + TtGiδ + x
′
itβ + uit compare the
sales of the Saab brand (1), and its two products (2) and (3), to the sales of the relevant, annually-rebalanced control group in order
to measure the effect of financial distress on Saab sales. Each specification contains a vector of additional control variables including
fixed effects for the Green Car Rebate, month interacted with the number of new car models introduced a given year within the control
group as well as a consumer confidence index. The estimated lower and upper bounds for the true treatment effect δ are given by
[
δ, δ¯
]
above in bold. 95% block bootstrapped confidence intervals are reported within square brackets below the estimated treatment effect
bounds. If the treatment effect is estimated to be positive (Placebo Test 2, columns (1) and (3)) we provide no upper bound, indicated
by “-”, because the bounds derived in Section 4 assume that the treatment effect is negative and the bounds are therefore no longer
applicable.
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Figure 1: Sales of Saab and of its control group at the monthly frequency from January 2006 to December 2009. Solid vertical lines
indicate the treatment period, which begins in November 2008 and ends in August 2009. The start of the treatment period coincides
with the financial problems of Saab’s parent company General Motors becoming public. The end of the treatment period coincides with
a Swedish court ending Saab’s administration status. Dashed vertical lines indicate Saab’s administration filing in February 2009. Panel
1a (top): Sales of Saab brand and annually rebalanced control group; Panel 1b (middle): Sales of Saab 9-3 and annually rebalanced
control group; Panel 1c (bottom): Sales of Saab 9-5 and annually rebalanced control group.
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Control Group Sales Saab 9−3 Sales
Figure 2: Sales of Saab and of its control group at the monthly frequency from January 2006 to December 2009. Solid vertical lines
indicate the treatment period, which begins in November 2008 and ends in August 2009. The start of the treatment period coincides
with the financial problems of Saab’s parent company General Motors becoming public. The end of the treatment period coincides with
a Swedish court ending Saab’s administration status. Dotted vertical lines indicate Saab’s administration filing in February 2009. Panel
2a (top): Sales of Saab 9-3 and synthetic control group constructed as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) by matching on standardized
product characteristics; Panel 2b (bottom): Sales of Saab 9-3 and synthetic control group constructed by matching only on product
sales.
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Synthetic Control Group: Sales
Figure 3: Sales of Opel Astra and sales of relevant control group at a monthly frequency from January 2006 to December 2009. Solid
vertical lines indicate treatment period beginning from November 2008 and ending in August 2009 respectively. The start of the
treatment period coincides with the financial problems of Saab’s parent company General Motors becoming public. The end of the
treatment period coincides with a Swedish court ending Saab’s administration status. The first dotted vertical line indicates Saab’s
administration filing in February 2009 whereas second dotted vertical line indicates GM’s bailout in June 2009. Panel 3a (top): Sales
of Opel Astra and synthetic control group constructed as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) by matching only on standardized product
characteristics; Panel 3b (bottom): Sales of Opel Astra and synthetic control group constructed by matching only on product sales.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: From assumption A1, we have that the biased treatment effect δ∗ is
given by
δ∗ = δ − d
giving the true treatment effect as
δ = δ∗ + d
By assumption A2, we have that the indirect treatment effect d is bounded
∆L ≤ d ≤ ∆U
so let d ≤ ∆U , then
δ∗ + d ≤ δ∗ + ∆U
Instead, let ∆L ≤ d, then
δ∗ + ∆L ≤ δ∗ + d
Combining the two cases, we get
δ∗ + ∆L ≤ δ∗ + d ≤ δ∗ + ∆U

Proof of Corollary 1: Under assumptions A2, the indirect treatment effect d is bounded by
0 ≤ d ≤ −δ (9)
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Under assumption A3, because we use a control group consisting of averages, the indirect treatment
effect is going to be d∗ = 1
K
d rather than d. Let d∗ also be bounded, with bounds given by
∆∗L ≤ d∗ ≤ ∆∗U
Dividing all terms in (9) by K ≥ 1, we see that d∗ is bounded by
0
K
≤ d
K
≤ − δ
K
or simply
0 ≤ d∗ ≤ − δ
K
(10)
Now, let us rewrite the right hand side of (10) as a function of the estimated treatment effect δ∗;
δ
K
= δ
∗ + d∗
K
= (δ
∗ + d∗) (K + 1)
K (K + 1)
= Kδ
∗ + δ∗ + d∗ − δ
K (K + 1)
= δ
∗
(K + 1) (11)
where we use the fact that δ∗ = δ − d∗ and that d∗ = − δ
K
at the upper bound. By Proposition
1, defining the indirect treatment effect as d∗ as given in (10), we have that under A1 and A2 the
true treatment effect is bounded
δ∗ + ∆∗L ≤ δ ≤ δ∗ + ∆∗U
Replacing ∆∗L,∆∗U in the previous expression by the values given in (10) gives
δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ δ∗ − δ
K
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and replacing the right hand side with the expression from (11) and simplifying,
δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ K(K + 1)δ
∗
Alternatively, for any level of substitution λ ∈ [0, 1] we have
δ∗ = δ − λd∗
= δ + λ δ
K
=
(
1 + λ
K
)
δ
which implies that
δ = K
K + λδ
∗

Proof of Corollary 2: From Corollary 1 we have that for any level of substitution λ ∈ [0, 1]
δ = K
K + λδ
∗
If we let δˆ and δˆ∗be estimators of δ and δ∗ respectively, we have that as K and λ are both
non-random (because the indirect treatment effect d was assumed to be non-random)
V ar
(
δˆ
)
= V ar
(
K
K + λδˆ
∗
)
=
[
K
K + λ
]2
V ar
(
δˆ∗
)

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Proof of Corollary 3: If we let δˆ and δˆ∗ be estimators of δ and δ∗ respectively, we have from
Corollary 1, for any level of substitution λ ∈ [0, 1] and size of the control group K ≥ 1
δˆ = K
K + λδˆ
∗
and from Corollary 2, that
V ar
(
δˆ
)
= V ar
(
K
K + λδˆ
∗
)
The standardized estimate of the true treatment effect is
δˆ√
V ar
(
δˆ
) = KK+λ δˆ∗√
V ar
(
K
K+λ δˆ
∗
)
=
K
K+λ
K
K+λ
δˆ∗√
V ar
(
δˆ∗
)
= δˆ
∗√
V ar
(
δˆ∗
)

Proof of Proposition 2: Starting with the definition of λ,
λ = −
∑K′
i=1,i 6=T εiT
εTT
−
∑K′′
i=1,i 6=T εiT
εTT
≤ −K
′εH
εTT
− K
′′εL
εTT
where the first equality follows from E4 and the inequality follwos from E2. By E3 and E1,
λ ≤ −K
′εH
εTT
<< 1

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Proof of Corollary 4: From Corollary 1 one can write δ = K
K+λδ
∗. Apply95% robust confidence intervals
given in parenthesis. ing the result in Proposition 2,
δ ≤ K
K − K′εH
εTT
δ∗
then equate K ′ = K to obtain the result.

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Appendix B: Empirical Evidence on Elasticities
We estimate a one-level nested logit demand model for the Swedish new vehicle market in order to
document empirical patterns consistent with the assumptions made in the text. The conditional
indirect utility to consumer i from purchasing product j = 1, ..., J is given by
uij = δj + εij = x′jβ − αpj + ξj + εij
where the mean utility δj combines observed exogenous product characteristics x′j such as engine
power and vehicle size, an observed endogenous product characteristic pj, price, and the unobserved
(by the econometrician) product characteristic ξj, typically a measure of quality or prestige of a
product. The individual-specific part of utility depends on a random term εij. Consumers may
decide not to purchase any product, in which case they choose the outside good 0, for which the
mean utility δ0 is normalized to zero.
The distribution of the random utility term εij follows the assumptions of a one-level nested
logit model. Assume that the market can be partitioned into G mutually exclusive groups, with
each group containing Jg products with
∑G
g=1 Jg = J . If consumers choose one unit of the product
to maximize their random utility, the nested logit distributional assumption leads to expressions
for choice probabilities (market shares) and the associated estimating equation is given by
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = x′jβ − αpj + σln(sjt|g) + ξjt
where we introduce the subscript t which indexes time periods (and/or markets) and sjt and sjt|g
measure product j’s overall and within-nest market shares, respectively. The nesting parameters
σ measures the heterogeneity of consumer preferences for cars belonging to the same group. Intu-
itively, products in a given group share a common set of features, for which consumers may have
correlated preferences. In our application, we define five groups according to their market segment:
subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard, and luxury (an additional group is reserved for the
outside good).50 Whenever σ = 0, that is, when preferences are uncorrelated for products of the
50We have also experimented with a number of alternative specifications. For instance, we have considered two-
level nested logit models with choices of (also in reverse order) (i) fuel and segment; (ii) segment and country
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same group, one obtains the simple logit model.
The fact that ξjt is unobserved by the econometrician (but not market participants) leads to a
potential correlation between price and the unobserved characteristic, typically requiring the use
of instrumental variables. We pursue two strategies in order to identify the price coefficient. First,
we rely on the use of product fixed-effects. According to this line of reasoning (Nevo 2001), if
unobserved product characteristics are (mostly) time-invariant – as quality and prestige typically
are– product fixed-effects should capture the component in ξjt correlated with prices, with the
remaining component consisting of idiosyncratic shocks.
Second, we rely on BLP markup instruments (Berry et al 1995), which are functions of the
exogenous product characteristics which should capture changes in prices driven by changes in
competition between firms and/or products via their characteristics.
INSERT TABLE B1 ABOUT HERE
Table B1 reports estimates of alternative nested logit specifications for the Swedish new vehicle
market during the pre-treatment period. Columns 1-4 report estimates of uninstrumented speci-
fications differing in the set of controls used: a fixed-effect for domestic brands Saab and Volvo,
country of origin fixed-effects, brand fixed-effects and model-fixed-effects (product fixed-effects);
in all of these, prices are scaled by per capita income. Column 5 is analogous to Column 4 but
replaces the price-income ratio with price. Column 6 uses BLP instruments to control for the
endogeneity of price.
The estimates in Table B1 highlight how the introduction of finer fixed-effects – model (product)
fixed-effects in the limiting case, see Columns 4 and 5 – attenuate price endogeneity. In fact, the
(uninstrumented) own price effects in Column 4 are not too far off from their (instrumented)
counterparts in Column 6. These findings suggest that a substantial component of unobservable
characteristics of a product are time-invariant.
Thus, the above results lend credence to the assumptions made in the text, such as negligible
between-group cross-price elasticities and homogeneity, where the common elasticities εH and εL
of origin of the brand; (iii) segment and whether the product is produced by a domestic brand (Volvo or Saab).
The resulting estimates were either inconsistent with utility maximization (e.g. correlations being higher than one,
correlation of the sub-group being lower than that of the group) or resulted in implausible elasticity estimates,
which led us to settle for the more parsimonious and robust specification reported in the text.
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can be taken as the biggest cross-price effects within and between groups, respectively.
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OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Period 2006-01/2008-11 2006-01/2008-11 2006-01/2008-11 2006-01/2008-11 2006-01/2008-11 2006-01/2008-11
Price/Income -0.099∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -1.022∗∗
(-4.70) (-4.57) (-9.27) (-4.38) (-2.27)
Price -0.137∗∗∗
(-3.86)
Segment share 0.935∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
(143.80) (146.59) (147.18) (173.91) (174.78) (2.98)
HP/Weight 3.848∗∗∗ 3.833∗∗∗ 5.754∗∗∗ 3.699∗∗∗ 3.642∗∗∗ 6.807∗∗∗
(6.23) (5.37) (6.79) (3.08) (2.95) (2.86)
dv(manual) 0.087∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.038 0.052 0.050 0.020
(2.57) (2.39) (1.22) (1.63) (1.57) (0.39)
Time FE’s X X X X X X
Fuel×Fuel econ. FE’s X X X X X X
Domestic FE’s X
Country FE’s X
Brand FE’s X
Model FE’s X X X
Observations 16,798 16,798 16,798 16,798 16,798 16,798
Sargan test (p-value) 0.999
Avg. Price Elasticities
Own -2.40 -2.97 -5.15 -5.51 -5.40 -6.77
[1.70] [1.77] [3.06] [3.28] [3.19] [4.01]
100% elastic? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross, same nest 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
[0.06] [0.07] [0.12] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13]
Cross, other nests 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Table B1: This table reports demand estimates for alternative nested logit specifications for the pre-treatment period. Nests are
defined according to five market segments (subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard, luxury). Columns 1-4 report estimates of
uninstrumented specifications differing in the set of controls used: a fixed-effect for domestic brands Saab and Volvo, country fixed-
effects, brand fixed-effects and model-fixed-effects; in all of them, prices (net of the GCR rebate, if applicable) are scaled by per capita
income. Column 5 replaces price/income with price in Column 4. Column 6 uses BLP instruments to account for the endogeneity
of price. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, standard errors are reported in square brackets; standard errors are clustered by
brand-year and significance levels are given at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) levels.
68
Appendix C: Construction of Synthetic Control Groups
In this Appendix, we describe in detail the construction of the synthetic control groups of Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) used in the robustness checks of Section 6.1.
Let W ∈ W be a vector of weights and let the set of all feasible weights be defined as
W =
{
x ∈ Rk such that x′1 =1and x ≥ 0
}
Let X1 be a j × 1 vector of product characteristics for a given Saab product and X0 be a j × k
matrix of product characteristics for k competing products. Let V denote a diagonal matrix of
weights such that for the set of feasible matrices V weights are non-negative and sum to one.51
Further, let S1 be a t× 1 vector of monthly sales for a given Saab product and S0 be a t×k vector
of monthly sales for the competing products.52
Equal and Standardized Characteristics Only As described in Section 4, the control groups
in this study are constructed by matching Saab products to close competitors, using only stan-
dardized characteristics X¯ which are assumed to be equally important. In a similar manner, one
can construct a control group by replicating the treated product in terms of characteristics by
using the characteristics of all competing products. The weights of each of the elements included
in the control group are chosen such that
W∗ = arg min
W∈W
(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)′
V
(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)
where V has 1/J on each diagonal element and the product characteristics are standardized in the
same manner as described in the main text. Having replicated the characteristics of the treated
product, the sales of the synthetic control group are given by S∗1 = S0W∗. The matrix V is chosen
specifically to allow as direct a comparison as possible between the control group constructed in
this study and that constructed using the synthetic matching methods of Abadie and Gardeazabal
51To lower the computational time needed to calculate V∗ below, the weights are chosen through a grid search
in which the step size is 0.1 for each weight.
52For simplicity, sales are aggregated by model rather than by model and fuel type as in the main text. In a
similar manner, characteristics are averaged both across model year and fuel type.
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(2003).
Sales Only Another possible way to construct the synthetic control group is choose the weight
W in such a way as to replicate the sales of the treatment group as closely as possible in the
pre-treatment period. In this way, one ensures that the outcome variables of the treatment and
synthetic control groups are as close as possible pre-treatment with the weights of the control
group elements instead being chosen such that
W∗ = arg min
W∈W
(S1 − S0W)′ (S1 − S0W)
and where V has been disregarded as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). In choosing weights
this way, one fully disregards the information about product characteristics but ensures that the
outcomes of the treatment and control groups are as indistinguishable as possible pre-treatment.
Once again, one can calculate the sales of the synthetic control group as S∗1 = S0W∗.
Sales and Characteristics As pointed out above, looking only at the sales or characteristics
of the treatment or control group elements disregards potential information that could be used in
constructing a suitable control group. This is why, to accommodate both the information regard-
ing outcome variables as well as control element characteristics, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
proposed choosing the optimal weights as before, by replicating the characteristics of treatment
group using control group elements with weights given by
W∗ = arg min
W∈W
(X1 −X0W)′V (X1 −X0W)
but choosing relative importance V so as to give the weights that also provide as close a fit as
possible for the outcome variable;
V∗ = arg min
V∈V
(S1 − S0W∗ (V))′ (S1 − S0W∗ (V))
In this way, all information regarding the treatment and control group elements are taken into
account when creating the synthetic control group.
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Supplementary Appendix (Not for Publication)
Promotional Activity and Investment
One concern is that the negative effect on the sales of Saab during the treatment period is due to an
increase in promotional activity e.g. spending on advertising, by the other manufacturers rather
than Saab’s financial distress. A key issue in exploring this effect is that data on promotional
activity conducted by the different brands is unavailable. We try to explore this issue by first
making the assumption that there is no unilateral increase in promotional activity for all the
vehicles in a given control group but instead that there was a large increase in promotional activity
for the vehicles that had the highest percentual increase in sales from 2008 to 2009. In other words,
the vehicles that saw the largest percentual increase in sales were assumed to be the vehicles for
which promotion was heavily increased and that also benefited the most. We proceed by completely
dropping the two best selling models from all 2009 control groups for both the Saab 9-3 and 9-5
and re-estimating the specifications with eight models in those control groups, as compared to ten
for the remaining years. We find that although the treatment effects are halved as compared to
the main specification in Table 5 they are still significant at the 95 percent significance level. We
feel that this is a conservative way of exploring the question of promotional activity because we are
in some sense leaving the “worst performing” models in the control groups for 2009 and thereby
severely reducing the estimated treatment effect.
It may also have been the case that GM took the decision to reduce investment in Saab as
well as cutting advertising spending in order to save money already prior to the events of late
2008. Advertising costs are posted under “Sales” costs, often together with other costs such as
transportation of sold goods in Swedish income statements. We see that apart from a large decline
in sales costs between 2005 and 2006, they remain fairly stable until 2008 when they increased
by roughly 60 percent from the year before. While this increase may have been due to increased
promotional activity and advertising, it is more likely that another post was responsible for this
increase.
INSERT TABLE S1 ABOUT HERE
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Overall, the income statements of Saab seem to suggest that during 2006 to 2009 that adver-
tising expenses were fairly stable.
Expenses for research and development however saw a steady decline from 2006 onwards, with
the expenses in 2009 being roughly one tenth of those in 2006. While this may help explain the
declining sales of Saab during the period, we do not believe this to be a contributing factor to
the decline in Saab market shares during the treatment period. The second generation 9-3 was
largely unchanged between 2002 and 2012 and the first generation 9-5 unchanged between 1997
and 2009. This would likely cause Saab to be less competitive as other manufacturers introduced
improvements to their existing models and new models altogether, something we try to control for
directly when looking at technological lagardness, but not the decline during the treatment period
itself.
Causality Tests
We conduct a number of Granger causality tests to assess the exogeneity of the treatment. For
each specification, we test whether the fact that Saab was treated can be predicted by lagged sales
using a linear probability model. Lagged sales in the pre-treatment period are used to predict the
occurrence of being treated using a linear probability model and to see whether declining sales
increased the probability that Saab was treated.
INSERT TABLE S2 ABOUT HERE
Table S2 reports two sets of results, using 1 and 12 lags, for the Saab 9-3, the Saab 9-5 and the
Saab brand in Columns 1-3. The null of no significance of lagged sales is comfortably rejected
throughout at the standard significance levels suggesting that declining sales pre-treatment are
not able to predict Saab’s entering into treatment.
Media and Technology
Accounting for the Technology Channel One concern about DD estimates quantifying con-
sumer responses to Saab’s financial distress is that these may be triggered as soon as consumers
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perceive that - due to being in difficulties - the company reduces investment in R&D and its prod-
ucts do not keep up with competition in technological or quality terms. For instance, the Swedish
press reported in 2008 on the postponement of the launch of the new version of the Saab 9-5. This
meant that a replacement for the then already severely aged 11 year-old model, was not likely to
come until 2010 (SvD 2008c). Following this reasoning, the flattening of Saab’s sales over time
before it files for administration would have occurred as a consequence of its technological lag with
respect to its competitors.
INSERT TABLE S3 ABOUT HERE
One way to capture the effect of lagging technological development or quality degradation of a
product is to construct measures of laggardness and include them as controls when estimating DD
effects.53 In what follows, we define two measures of distance between products in characteristic
space to account for this effect. First, we compute the sum of the Euclidean distances between
Saab products and those in the control group, that is, ∑i∈Gj ∂ij, where ∂ij is the Euclidean distance
in characteristic space between a Saab product j and close competitor i. Second, we compute the
number of negative deviations in characteristics between Saab and the elements of the control
group.54
INSERT TABLE S4 ABOUT HERE
The results for models 9-3 and 9-5 are reported in Columns 1-2 of Tables Tables S3 and S4,
respectively. In either case, the measures of degradation are statistically insignificant at a 5%
significance level and the DD estimates are similar to those not controlling for technological lag
(see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5). In fact, DD estimates tend to strengthen when controlling for
the technology channel, regardless of the specific measure considered.
53While the literature on quality degradation, e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), Crawford
and Shum (2007), has mostly focused on the active (strategic) choice of degrading quality, e.g. due to market
structure, here it appears as a consequence of the company’s poor financial health.
54A negative deviation is one that is perceived negatively by a consumer. For example a lower price than that of
another model is viewed positively whereas lower horsepower is viewed negatively.
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News articles and printed media Data on newspaper publications was obtained from Af-
färsdata AB. We collected data on printed newspapers within the two categories "Local/Regional
Printed Press" and "Large City Press", and number of articles contained therein, for a given
year/month and search word. The search words used were Saab,55 Cadillac, Chevrolet, GM,
General Motors and Opel.
The information on newspapers available in a given municipality, and the number of articles
contained therein, were merged with data from The Press Subsidies Council (Presstödsnämnden)
on the annual penetration rates of printed media within each Swedish municipality during 2007-
2009. This gives, for each municipality, the newspapers and respective number of articles containing
a given search word with a household penetration greater than 1 percent of all households.
Accounting for the Media Channel Given the potential perception of Saab’s financial fragility,
the media coverage of Saab’s financial situation was likely to increase in the months prior to Saab’s
filing for administration. In order to measure exposure to news regarding the carmaker Saab, we
construct two separate indices; the first index is merely a sum of all newspaper articles printed
in newspapers having a household penetration rate greater than 1 percent within a given munic-
ipality, year-month and containing the key word "Saab".56 The second index gives the number
of households within a given municipality that have potentially been exposed to a printed article
containing the word "Saab":
It =
∑
k
Hk,t
∑
i∈Pk,t
γi,k,tni,k,t
where, for newspaper i, for municipality k in period t, I is the index value, H the number of
households, P the set of all newspapers with a household penetration of at least 1 percent, γ the
household penetration rate of a given newspaper and n the number of articles published.
55Excluding the words JAS, Aero and combinations thereof to mitigate the chances of obtaining articles containing
news on Saab Group, the defense manufacturer.
56Additionally, we also use the number of articles containing the words “Cadillac”, “Chevrolet”, “General Motors”,
“GM” and “Opel” but, qualitatively, the results do not change.
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The results for Saab models 9-3 and 9-5 are reported in Columns 4-5 of Tables S3 and S4,
respectively. Since media coverage is available only from 2007, the baseline specifications against
which Columns 4-5 are to be compared are Columns 3 in Tables S3 and S4. We see that as in the
case with the measures of degradation, the measures of media exposure are also insignificant for
both the Saab 9-3 and the Saab 9-5.
Miscellaneous Robustness Checks
Construction of Control Groups We performed a number of robustness checks which did not
change the results. First, we constructed control groups of sizes 8 and 12 instead of the standard
10. Next, we dropped models with sales of less than 50 units in a given year from the sample used
to construct control groups - again, the results follow through.
Rebalanced vs. Fixed Control Group We perform the entire analysis together with robust-
ness checks also using a control group that is set in 2006 and never rebalanced. The results are
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of the main analysis. A brief summary of
the results is presented in Figure S1 and Table S5.
Sales-weighted Results We report our most conservative results in the text, namely the case
where the models in the control group are equally weighted. We have estimated the very same spec-
ifications with models weighted according to sales obtaining stronger results and similar qualitative
implications.
Treatment Period Since consumers might react to Saab’s administration, we redefine the post-
treatment period to start in February 2009 instead of December 2008. The results are robust to
this change. We have also experimented with an earlier start of the treatment period, with stronger
results.
75
Market Shares Our use of sales instead of market shares as the dependent variable in the text
is due to the fact that the latter obfuscate the role of the outside good, i.e. the fact that consumers
may well not purchase a car at all given the fact that Saab is under administration. As a robustness
test, however, we have re-estimated all specifications using market shares rather than sales. While
the effect of Saab’s administration is still qualitatively significant, the parallel trends tests fail to
hold if we are to use market shares of the treatment and control group over the sample period
2006-2009.
Block Bootstrap In our application we calculate 95% confidence intervals by using a block
bootstrap whereby we randomly draw blocks with a length of 6 months with replacement from
the original sample and estimate the model given in (8) five hundred times. Thereafter, we use
the distribution of the simulated coefficients to determine the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. We
have also conducted this exercise using blocks of 2 and 12 months. The results using the 12-month
block length do not differ in any significant way from those using 6-month blocks, suggesting that
we adequately capture any dependence in the residuals using a 6-month block. Using blocks of
2-month length give substantially narrower confidence intervals but to be conservative we report
all confidence intervals using the 6-month block length.
Additional References
[1] Crawford, G. S. and M. Shum (2007), Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable
Television. Journal of Law and Economics 50, 181-219.
[2] Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), Monopoly with Incomplete Information. RAND Journal of
Economics 15, 171–96.
[3] Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978), Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal of Economic Theory
18, 301–17.
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Supplementary Appendix Tables and Figures
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sales Costs (MSEK)* - 2,114 - 690 - 561 - 925 - 652
Research and Development (MSEK)* - 1,649 - 1,613 - 1,015 - 291 - 134
Table S1: Evolution of sales and research and development costs of Saab Automobile AB during the period of 2005 to 2009. Numbers in
million SEK. *Source: Income Statement of Saab Automobile AB Annual Reports available from the Swedish Companies Registration
Office (Bolagsverket).
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Saab brand sales Saab 9-3 sales Saab 9-5 sales
Sample Period 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12
Panel A: Lags = 1 F-Statistic
0.00 1.68 1.68
(0.94) (0.20) (0.20)
Panel B: Lags = 12 F-Statistic
0.07 0.08 0.08
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Table S2: Granger Causality tests to check exogeneity of treatment. For each specification, we test whether the fact that Saab was
treated can be predicted by lagged sales using a linear probability model. Lagged sales in the pre-treatment period are used to predict
the occurrence of being treated using a linear probability model and to see whether declining sales increased the probability that Saab
was treated. F-statistic is for the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all lagged sales values are jointly equal to zero.
P-value in parenthesis. Specification 1 shows the causality tests for the Saab brand, Specification 2 for the Saab 9-3 and Specification
3 for the Saab 9-5.
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(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Saab brand sales Saab 9-3 sales Saab 9-5 sales
Sample Period 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12 2006-01/2009-12
Bounded Treatment Effect:
[
δ, δ¯
] [-283.51, -257.74] [-218.10, -198.27] [-66.71, -60.65]
[-421.55, -158.89] [-326.24, -115.96] [-119.69, -26.57]
GCR FE X X X
Consumer Confidence X X X
Month x Introductions FE:s X X X
Observations 96 96 96
R-squared 0.769 0.763 0.710
Table S5: Results of Difference-in-Differences specifications described in Section 4 and given by yit = θi + µt + TtGiδ + x
′
itβ + uit
comparing the sales of the Saab brand (1), and its two products (2) and (3), to the sales of the relevant, fixed 2006 control group in order
to measure the effect of financial distress on Saab sales. The treatment window is defined to be between November 2008 to August 2009.
The start of the treatment period coincides with the financial problems of Saab’s parent company General Motors becoming public. The
end of the treatment period coincides with a Swedish court ending Saab’s administration status. Each specification contains a vector
of additional control variables including fixed effects for the Green Car Rebate, month interacted with the number of new car models
introduced a given year as well as a consumer confidence index. The estimated lower and upper bounds for the true treatment effect δ
are given by
[
δ, δ¯
]
above in bold. 95% block bootstrapped confidence intervals are reported within square brackets below the estimated
treatment effect bounds.
80
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
Sa
ab
 9
−3
 S
al
es
20
40
60
80
10
0
Co
nt
ro
l G
ro
up
 S
al
es
20
06
m1
20
07
m1
20
08
m1
20
09
m1
20
10
m1
date
Control Group Sales Saab 9−3 Sales
50
10
01
50
20
02
50
Sa
ab
 9
−5
 S
al
es
20
40
60
80
Co
nt
ro
l G
ro
up
 S
al
es
20
06
m1
20
07
m1
20
08
m1
20
09
m1
20
10
m1
date
Control Group Sales Saab 9−5 Sales
Figure S1: Sales of Saab and sales of relevant control group at a monthly frequency from January 2006 to December 2009. Solid vertical
lines indicate beginning from November 2008 and ending in August 2009 respectively. The start of the treatment period coincides with
the financial problems of Saab’s parent company General Motors becoming public. The end of the treatment period coincides with a
Swedish court ending Saab’s administration status. Broken vertical line indicates Saab’s administration filing in February 2009. Panel
S1a (top): Sales of Saab 9-3 and fixed 2006 control group; Panel S1b (bottom): Sales of Saab 9-5 and fixed 2006 control group.
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